552 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



fellow. These latter are partly direct and partly indirect or second- 

 ary relations. 



Tbe direct relationships in this case are those of a man to the con- 

 crete />erso/i of his human fellow. These direct relationships are sim- 

 ple and not very numerous, in fact, although they assume countless 

 variations of circumstance and form. Some of them are special, like 

 the relations that exist between parent and child and between hus- 

 band and wife ; some of them ai-e limited, like the relations that exist 

 between the sexes; and some of them are common and universal. In 

 the conduct which is incident to these relationships there has seemed 

 to be a great variety of distiuguishable qualities of the absolute sort, 

 and we iiave a lengthy catalogue of names in the nomenclature of 

 morals to represent them ; but I am disposed to believe that, after all, 

 there are only two radical qualities (with their opposites) to be found 

 in this sphere of Imman conduct. These are benevolence and justice. 

 All the rest, which appear upon the surface as distinguishable moral 

 qualities, I conclude to be either variations of these in degree and by 

 circumstance, or else the resultant of some blending of them with the 

 moral qualities of the other order. Such blending is necessarily in- 

 cessant, because the relationships under which man is acting are al- 

 ways mixed. Mr. Lecky has given the name of the "amiable virtues" 

 to a considerable group of these moral qualities, such as charity, gen- 

 erosity, magnanimity, mercifulness or clemency, kindness, and so on, 

 every one of which would seem to have its root in benevolence, or in 

 benevolence and justice combined, and to be merely circumstantial 

 modifications of the same essential quality. Then we have, appertain- 

 ing to this relationship, such qualities as fidelity and honor if the 

 two are really distinguishable and both of these are clearly produced 

 by an intermixture of the absolute personal quality of truthfulness 

 with the absolute social quality of justice. Whatever else there may 

 be of distinguishable moral qualities appearing to be incident to the 

 direct relations of human fellowship, I am sure that they will be found 

 reducible to the two radicals of benevolence and justice, or to their 

 combination with those other radicals courage and truthfulness 

 which we found to have an intrinsic source in the constitution of man, 

 as qualitative factors in human conduct. 



The indirect or secondary relations that exist between man and 

 man as human fellows are those which extend to something additional 

 to the person to things, that is, which have become recognizably 

 identified with the person. In these relationships the whole notion of 

 "property" is involved. The idea of "property" is the idea of a 

 special relation existing between a certain man and certain things, in 

 recognizing which we necessarily recognize 1. That our own relations 

 to those things are modified by it ; and, 2. That it introduces a ncAV set 

 of relations between ourselves and the man, which are indirect, be- 

 cause the things in question are intermediate in them. Not only tan- 



