CIVILIZATION AND MORALS. 553 



gible but intangible things become thus associated with tlie person- 

 ality of our fellow-man, and give rise to these indirect relationships. 

 His opinions and beliefs, his friendships and his reputation, tlje objects 

 of liis affections, the franchises that he acquires under the artificial 

 institutions of society, are all examples of the intangible things which 

 become intervening subjects and objects in many of the relationships 

 that a man sustains toward his fellow-men. The indirectness of the 

 relationships thus created is productive of great complexity in them, 

 and gives rise to much confusion of moral notions with reference to 

 the conduct that is incident to them. Out of all the complications 

 that arise, however, there is not one distinctly new quality evolved. 

 We distinguish in this region of conduct such absolute characteristics 

 as those of honesty (under many names) and tolerance, but they are 

 all of the composite class, and have their root, for the most part, in 

 justice and truthfulness intermingled, with benevolence sometimes 

 imparting its amiable tone to them. 



As the result of our survey, then, we have discovered but four ab- 

 solute qualities in human conduct that are simple and radical, while 

 we have traced a very few of the numerous qualities that are com- 

 posite, or derived, to the relationships out of which they arise. We 

 have : 



Of radical qualities of the personal order courage and truthful- 

 ness. 



Of radical qualities of the social order benevolence and jixstice. 



Of derived and composite qualities of the personal order temper- 

 ance, chastity, fortitude, patience, etc., with their opposites. 



Of derived and composite qualities of the social order two 

 classes, viz. : 



1, Incident to direct social relationships : charity, generosity, mag- 

 nanimity, mercifulness, kindness, fidelity, patriotism, etc., with their 

 many-named opposites. 



2. Incident to indirect social relationships : honesty in all its forms, 

 and with all its opposites, which are numerous in the nomenclature of 

 morals. 



Having acquired, so far as this, a partly definite notion of morals, 

 we may now return to take up the conception of civilization, and bring 

 the two sets of ideas into conjunction. 



I did not venture to say of civilization that it is " a certain degree 

 of progress " in the state of man, because there are those who deny 

 that the cumulative succession of changes, in man and society, which 

 appear in the process called civilization, are, on the whole, progressive 

 chancces. Their denial, moreover, has reference entirely to the moral 

 features of the process. They do not question the fact that human 

 history, in the civilized communities, is a liistory of intellectual de- 

 velopment and advancement. Tliey concede the largest claims that 

 can be made as to the growth of knowledge among men ; as to the 



