OJV THE EVOLUTION OF THE FAMILY. 139 



" Social Types " will scarcely need reminding that in various parts 

 of the world we find social groups without heads, as the Fuegians, 

 some Australians, most Esquimaux, the Arafuras, the Land Dyaks of 

 the Upper Sarawak River ; others with headships that are but occa- 

 sional, as Tasmanians, some Australians, some Caribs, some Uaupes ; 

 and many others with vague and unstable headships, as the Andama- 

 nese, Abipones, Snakes, Chippewyans, Chinooks, Chippeways, some 

 Kamtchatdales, Guiana tribes, Mandans, Coroados, New Guinea peo- 

 ple, Tannese. Though it is true that in some of these cases tlie com- 

 munities are of the lowest, I see no adequate reason for excluding 

 them from our conception of " the infancy of society." And even 

 saying nothing of these, we cannot regard as lower than infantine in 

 their stages those communities Avhicli, like the Upper Sarawak Dyaks, 

 the Arafuras, the New Guinea people, carry on their peaceful lives 

 without other government than that of public opinion and custom. 

 Moreover, as has been pointed out, what headship exists in many 

 simple groups is not patriarchal. Such chieftainship as arose among 

 the Tasmanians in time of war was determined by personal fitness. 

 So, too, according to Edwards, with the Caribs, and, according to 

 Swan, with the Creeks. Then, still further showing that political 

 authority does not always begin with patriarchal authority, we have 

 the Iroquois, whose system of kinship negatives the genesis of patri- 

 archs, and who yet have developed a complex republican government ; 

 and we have the Pueblos, who, living in well-organized communities 

 under elected governors and councils, show no signs of patriarchal 

 rule in the past. 



Another component of the doctrine is that, originally, property is 

 held by the family as a corporate body. According to Sir Henry 

 Maine, "one peculiarity invariably distinguishing the infancy of 

 society " is that "men are regarded and treated not as individuals 

 but always as members of the particular group." The man was not 

 " regarded as himself, as a distinct individual. Ilis individuality was 

 swallowed up in his family." And this alleged primitive submergence 

 of the individual affects even the absolute ruler of the group. 

 "Though the patriarch, for we must not yet call him the pater- 

 familias, had rights thus extensive, it is impossible to doubt that he 

 lay under an equal amplitude of obligations. If he governed the 

 family it was for its behoof. If he was lord of its possessions, he 

 held them as trustee for his children and kindred . . . the family, in 

 fact, was a corporation ; and he was its representative." Here, after 

 expressing the doubt whether there can exist in the primitive mind 

 ideas so abstract as those of trusteeship and representation, I go on 

 to remark that this hypothesis involves a conception difficult to 

 frame. For while the patriarch is said to hold his possessions "m a 

 representative rather than a proprietary character," he is said to have 

 unqualified dominion over children, as over slaves, extending to life 



