CIVILIZATION AND MORALS. 



551 



intrinsic in man (as between his ruling faculties and the organs whicli 

 they rule, or between his reason and his will, on the one hand, and his 

 affections, appetites, and senses, on the other), the field of moral inves- 

 tigation enlarges, but is still limited. There seem to be two forms 

 in which the absoluteness of quality that we are searching after in 

 human conduct is found appertaining to these intrinsic relationships. 

 We have it, I think, in the qualities that we call truthfulness and 

 courage, and I do not perceive it in any others within this category, 

 except such as are no more than modifications and combinations of 

 these, with tlieir opposites. I cannot now go beyond this mere state- 

 ment of a conclusion, unless it be to suggest that such distinguisliable 

 moral qualities as patience, fortitude, resignation, and so on, are modi- 

 fications of the radical quality of courage ; while another order of 

 qualities, like temperance, chastity, and sincerity, have their root in 

 truthfulness, or integrity, which may be the better name. Out of 

 these two radicals there may be derived, I think, by combination and 

 modification, all the qualities which I should classify as the moral 

 qualities of the personal order. 



The final set of relationships to be investigated is that which 

 exists between the individual man and his fellow-men ; and here the 

 field of moral study opens to its widest dimensions. These social 

 relationships are varied, numerous, and highly complicated by inter- 

 mixture. It might be supposed that we should have to divide them 

 into two principal groups, embracing 1. Such relations as exist be- 

 tween man and man individually ; and, 2. Such relations as exist 

 between the individual man and his fellows at large, in the united 

 body which we call society; but it will be found that a man's relations 

 to society are only the sum of his relations to the several members of 

 it, and that society, in fact, is nothing more to him than a congrega- 

 tion of the persons between whom and himself he comes to recognize 

 that there are relations of human fellowship existing. Nothing new, 

 as a true factor in morals, is introduced by social organization not 

 even by the institution of government ; because that is a mere ar- 

 rangement for defining (sometimes arbitrarily and incorrectly) the re- 

 lations between individuals. These relations between individuals, 

 then, are what we have to examine, and they seem to divide them- 

 selves as follows : 



1. The relationship in which one man stands toward another simply 

 as a living creature. This is identical with the relation existing be- 

 tween man and brute animals, in the conduct incident to which we 

 discovered no moral quality except that of cruelty and its unnamed 

 opposite ; and we need not go far in human history to find social states 

 and circumstances in which no other relationship than this is often 

 recognizable between men, and under which no other moral quality 

 <3an often exist in the conduct that is incident to it. 



2. The relationships which one man sustains to another as a human 



