12 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true conclusion. 

 The new conception here involved is that of reality. It may be asked 

 how I know that there are any realities. If this hypothesis is the 

 sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must 

 not be used to support my hypothesis. The reply is this: 1. If in- 

 vestigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are real things, 

 it at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion ; but the method 

 and the conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No 

 doubts of the method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, 

 as is the case with all the others. 2. The feeling which gives rise to 

 any method of fixing belief is a dissatisfaction at two repugnant 

 propositions. But here already is a vague concession that there is 

 some one thing to which a proposition should conform. Nobody, 

 therefore, can really doubt that there are realities, or, if he did, 

 doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis, 

 therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social im- 

 pulse does not cause me to doubt it. 3. Everybody uses the scien- 

 tific method about a great many things, and only ceases to use it 

 when he does not know how to apply it. 4. Experience of the method 

 has not led me to doubt it, but, on the contrary, scientific inves- 

 tigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of set- 

 tling opinion. These afford the explanation of my not doubting the 

 method or the hypothesis which it supposes ; and not having any 

 doubt, nor believing that anybody else whom I could influence has, 

 it would be the merest babble for me to say more about it. If 

 there be anybody with a living doubt upon the subject, let him con- 

 sider it. 



To describe the method of scientific investigation is the object of 

 this series of papers. At present I have only room to notice some 

 points of contrast between it and other methods of fixing belief. 



This is the only one of the four methods which presents any dis- 

 tinction of a right and a wrong way. If I adopt the method of 

 tenacity and shut myself out from all influences, whatever I think 

 necessary to doing this is necessary according to that method. 

 So with the method of authority : the state may try to put down 

 heresy by means which, from a scientific point of view, seem very ill- 

 calculated to accomplish its purposes ; but the only test on that meth- 

 od is what the state thinks, so that it cannot pursue the method 

 wrongly. So with the a priori method. The very essence of it is to 

 think as one is inclined to think. All metaphysicians will be sure to 

 do that, however they may be inclined to judge each other to be per- 

 versely wrong. The Hegelian system recognizes every natural ten- 

 dency of thought as logical, although it be certain to be abolished by 

 counter-tendencies. Hegel thinks there is a regular system in the 

 succession of these tendencies, in consequence of which, after drifting 

 one way and the other for a long time, opinion will at last go right. 



