ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE. 5 



which we must already know before we can have any clear concep- 

 tion of reasoning at all, it cannot be supposed to be any longer of 

 much interest to inquire into their truth or falsity. On the other 

 hand, it is easy to believe that those rules of reasoning which are 

 deduced from the very idea of the process are the ones which are the 

 most essential ; and, indeed, that so long as it conforms to these it 

 will, at least, not lead to false conclusions from true premises. In 

 point of fact, the importance of what may be deduced from the as- 

 sumptions involved in the logical question turns out to be greater 

 than might be supposed, and this for reasons which it is difficult to 

 exhibit at the outset. The only one which I shall here mention is, 

 that conceptions which are really products of logical reflection, with- 

 out being readily seen to be so, mingle with our ordinary thoughts, 

 and are frequently the causes of great confusion. This is the case, 

 for example, with the conception of quality. A quality as such is 

 never an object of observation. We can see that a thing is blue or 

 green, but the quality of being blue and the quality of being green 

 are not things which we see ; they are products of logical reflection. 

 The truth is, that common-sense, or thought as it first emerges above 

 the level of the narrowly practical, is deeply imbued with that bad 

 logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied ; 

 and nothing can clear it up but a severe course of logic. 



III. 



"We generally know when we wish to ask a question and when we 

 wish to pronounce a judgment, for there is a dissimilarity between the 

 sensation of doubting and that of believing. 



But this is not all which distinguishes doubt from belief. There is 

 a practical difference. Our beliefs guide our desires and shape our 

 actions. The Assassins, or followers of the Old Man of the Mountain, 

 used to rush into death at his least command, because they believed 

 that obedience to him would insure everlasting felicity. Had they 

 doubted this, they would not have acted as they did. So it is with 

 every belief, according to its degree. The feeling of believing is a 

 more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature 

 some habit which will determine our actions. Doubt never has such 

 an effect. 



Nor must we overlook a third point of difference. Doubt is an un- 

 easy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves 

 and pass into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satis- 

 factory state which we do not wish to avoid, or to change to a belief 

 in anything else.' On the contrary, we cling tenaciously, not merely 

 to believing, but to believing just what we do believe. 



1 I am not speaking of secondary effects occasionally produced by the interference 

 of other impulses. 



