294 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



III. 



Let us illustrate this rule by some examples ; and, to begin with 

 the simplest one possible, let us ask what we mean by calling a thing 

 hard. Evidently that it will not be scratched by many other sub- 

 stances. The whole conception of this quality, as of every other, lies 

 in its conceived, effects. There is absolutely no difference between a 

 hard tiling and a soft thing so long as they are not brought to the 

 test. Suppose, then, that a diamond could be crystallized in the midst 

 of a cushion of soft cotton, and should remain there until it was finally 

 burned up. Would it be false to say that that diamond was soft ? 

 This seems a foolish question, and would be so, in fact, except in the 

 realm of logic. There such questions are often of the greatest utility 

 as serving to bring logical principles into sharper relief than real dis- 

 cussions ever could. In studying logic we must not put them aside 

 with hasty answers, but must consider them with attentive care, in 

 order to make out the principles involved. We may, in the present 

 case, modify our question, and ask what prevents us from saying that 

 all hard bodies remain perfectly soft until they are touched, when 

 their hardness increases with the pressure until they are scratched. 

 Reflection will show that the reply is this : there would be no falsity 

 in such modes of speech. They would involve a modification of our 

 present usage of speech with regard to the words hard and soft, but 

 not of their meanings. For they represent no fact to be different 

 from what it is ; only they involve arrangements of facts which would 

 be exceedingly maladroit. This leads us to remark that the question 

 of what would occur under circumstances which do not actually arise 

 is not a question of fact, but only of the most perspicuous arrange- 

 ment of them. For example, the question of free-will and fate in its 

 simplest form, stripped of verbiage, is something like this: I have 

 done something of which I am ashamed ; could I, by an effort of the 

 will, have resisted the temptation, and done otherwise ? The philo- 

 sophical reply is, that this is not a question of fact, but only of the 

 arrangement of facts. Arranging them so as to exhibit what is par- 

 ticularly pertinent to my question namely, that I ought to blame 

 myself for having done wrong it is perfectly true to say that, if I had 

 willed to do otherwise than I did, I should have done otherwise. On 

 the other hand, arranging the facts so as to exhibit another important 

 consideration, it is equally true that, when a temptation has once been 

 allowed to work, it will, if it has a certain force, produce its effect, let 

 me struggle how I may. There is no objection to a contradiction in 

 what would result from a false supposition. The reductio ad absur- 

 dum consists in showing that contradictory results would follow from 

 a hypothesis which is consequently judged to be false. Many questions 

 arc involved in the free-will discussion, and I am far from desiring to 

 say that both sides are equally right. On the contrary, I am of opinion 



