PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION. 649 



and in thus deciding, the court simply followed English precedents 

 of long standing and the highest character.* 



It may, however, be objected that the practical effect of this 

 decision has been to relieve all negotiable instruments from taxa- 

 tion, inasmuch as, removed beyond the territory and jurisdiction of 

 the State in which their owner resides, they will not, by reason of 

 easy concealment (for which safe-deposit companies in the larger 

 cities of most of the States now offer great facilities), be easily cog- 

 nizable by the assessors of the locality in which they are deposited. 

 But admitting the objection in full force, as in all reason we must, 

 what then? The Supreme Court has given its opinion clearly and 

 unmistakably; and until this opinion is reversed, it constitutes the 

 legitimate rule of action for both assessors and taxpayers. But sup- 

 pose it were possible to reverse the opinion in question, would it 

 be expedient to do so? Would it be desirable to abandon the plain 

 common-sense view that the situs for the taxation of all personal 

 property is where the law protects it, and where alone an assess- 

 ment and a legal attachment against it can be enforced, and in its 

 place make situs depend on visibility? And if visibility, what 

 degree of visibility? Shall a diamond, a bar of gold, or a railroad 

 bond, belonging to A. B., residing in Boston, but openly displayed 

 in a jeweler's or broker's window in Philadelphia, be taxable in 

 Pennsylvania, and a similar diamond, gold bar, or bond of the same 

 owner, deposited in a drawer of the same shop or office and not so 

 readily visible, be taxable in Massachusetts? Shall we make the 

 situs of property for taxation depend upon the keenness of per- 

 ception or visual organs of an assessor? Or shall we not rather, 

 admit that the attempt to raise revenue by taxing such property as 

 negotiable instruments which from their very nature are in a high 

 degree intangible and invisible, and thus easy of concealment; 

 which, passing by delivery, are here to-day and somewhere else 

 to-morrow; which are not taxed in any other highly civilized coun- 

 try, and which are in great part, even in this country, specifically 

 exempted by law — i. e., United States bonds, legal tender, national 

 bank notes, etc. — is in itself an absurdity and a wrong; inasmuch 

 as to enforce a levy from one man for one species of property, 

 because through his honesty, ignorance, or inability to escape he 

 can be laid hold of, and allow identically the same description of 



* Lord Ellenborough, in King's Bench (Neilage vs. Holloway, Barnwell and Allison's Re- 

 ports, 318), having decided that a negotiable note was a chattel personal and not a chose in 

 action; Lord Abinger, that all foreign government bonds payable to bearer have & situs 

 where they are actually situated ; and the House of Lords, that registered stocks and bonds 

 of the United States and of the several States not passing by delivery, are not negotiable 

 instruments, and therefore not taxable as goods and chattels. 



VOL LII. — 47 



