PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION. 803 



" The same court also held to similar conclusions in a number of 

 otlier cases. Thus, in the case of Pelham vs. Rose, 9 Wall., 103, a 

 note, the evidence of the credit, not the credit itself, was the thing 

 proceeded against. In the case of Pelham vs. Way, 15 Wall., 196, 

 where the court also held that the proceedings, not having been 

 against either the debt or credit, but only against the material evi- 

 dence of it, and that material evidence having been out of the 

 marshal's jurisdiction, no confiscation had been effected. 



" ]STow, if these decisions," said Judge Foster to his colleagues in 

 the Court of Errors, " are to be recognized as law, how can it be 

 claimed that on this credit, given by Kirtland to Cummings in the 

 State of Illinois, secured by a deed of real estate there situate, held 

 by a trustee resident there, the debtor being domiciled there, the 

 debt made payable there, the laws of Illinois by express agreement 

 to govern the contract; how (for the question bears repeating) can 

 it be claimed that there is any subject-matter within the jurisdiction 

 of Connecticut on which to impose a tax? 



. " That the land in Illinois which is the security for this debt, and 

 of which this debt is the representative, has borne its full share of 

 taxes without diminution on account of this debt is not denied. If 

 the land were in Connecticut, this would suffice; no tax could be 

 collected on the debt. That the land is in Illinois can not affect the 

 principle. If each State has dominion over the property, real and 

 personal, within its territory for the purposes of taxation — and he 

 must be a bold man who denies it — that dominion must, from its 

 nature, be exclusive. No other State can have concurrent jurisdic- 

 tion. Nor does any other State become invested with the power to 

 tax, if the State in which the power is vested omits to exercise that 

 power. Should a State exempt the property, real or personal, within 

 its limits, belonging to non-residents, from taxation, by what au- 

 thority could any foreign State impose taxes on such property? The 

 question is purely jurisdictional, and the matter of double taxation 

 is not involved. The point is not whether the State may tax a thing 



Kennedy, one of the obligors and mortgagors, to pay the debt into the court, for the use of 

 the United States ; and in pursuance of the decree the payment was made to the officers 

 of the court. After the termination of the war, or in 1868, Brown, the obligee and mort- 

 gagee in this bond and mortgage, having obtained a pardon from the President of the 

 United States, filed a bill in the United States Circuit Court for the district of Kansas 

 against Kennedy and wife, for the foreclosure of this mortgage. The principal defense 

 was, that the mortgage and the debt secured by it had been confiscated under the act of 

 Congress. That, of course, put in issue the validity of those proceedings. It was admitted 

 as matter of fact and agreed, that Brown, the complainant, was and always had been a 

 resident of Virginia, had been a continuous resident of the State from June, 1860, to Sep- 

 tember, 1865, and neither the bond nor mortgage in question was during any part of that 

 time in the district of Kansas. 



