EVOLUTION AND TELEOLOGY. 819 



and matter, and all the phenomena which can come under our 

 observation to the action of force on matter, or to the fortuitous 

 clash of atoms and molecules. They wish to eliminate from their 

 discussions all reference to a creative, directive and intelligent Mind, 

 for, as they contend, such a mind is not only unnecessary but is 

 something which is absolutely unknowable and unthinkable. Elim- 

 inating mind from the universe means eliminating purposiveness 

 from Nature, and carries with it, of course, the destruction of all 

 forms of teleology. 



Herbert Spencer's works, for instance, are remarkable for their 

 undisguised attempt entirely to eliminate all teleological language 

 and eschew all teleological implications. But, strive as he may, 

 the great corypheus of agnosticism is utterly unable, even in the 

 simplest definitions, to find language that does not, directly or in- 

 directly, imply aim and purpose, and, consequently, an intelligent 

 designer. Thus, in his Principles of Biology, he says that " physi- 

 ology, in its concrete interpretations, recognizes special functions 

 as the ends of special organs; regards the teeth as having the office 

 of mastication; the heart as an apparatus to propel blood; this 

 gland as fitted to produce one requisite secretion, and that to pro- 

 duce another; each muscle as the agent of a particular motion; each 

 nerve as the vehicle of a special sensation or a special motor im- 

 pulse." * 



All this, however, is teleological language of the most pro- 

 nounced character. It is seen in the word " function," which im- 

 plies adaptation and, consequently, preparation and purpose; it is 

 seen in the word " end," which here signifies " aim " ; it is seen 

 in the word " apparatus " — ad-paratus — which means a mechan- 

 ism contrived for a specific purpose or operation — a means devised 

 for obtaining some special end, for accomplishing something which 

 has been foreseen and intended. Similarly the words " office," 



"agent," " fitted to," " recognizes," are all teleological, and replete 

 with the idea of mental purpose. In spite, then, of all agnostic 

 philosophy, in spite of all abstractions which would distort the 

 original signification of words, we have in this simple definition of 

 Spencer's words which are positively surcharged with teleology. 

 But they do no more than express what the observer actually sees 

 and what actually takes place in the economy of Nature. In spite, 

 therefore, of all his attempts to avoid teleological terms, Spencer, 

 like others of his school, is forced, by the very nature and structure 

 of language, to employ them and to make use of expressions which 

 indicate aim, preparation, purposiveness; which imply intelligence, 



foresight, design, a designer. 



* Pages 155 el seq. 



