380 NATURAL SCIENCE [December 



occurred " the formation of molecules more and more heterogeneous." 

 The inference which may fairly be drawn is, that the properties of 

 living substance are the resultants of the properties of its components. 

 But at first sight this does not seem to square well with the asser- 

 tion that " the processes which go on in living things are incompre- 

 hensible as the results of any physical actions known to us." One 

 can picture how certain folk will gloat and " chortle in their joy " 

 over this confession, for such it will almost inevitably be regarded. 

 But it is not likely that Mr Spencer is here, in so vital a matter, 

 false to the evolution he has done so much to elucidate. The two 

 seemingly contradictory statements are not really contradictory ; they 

 are made in different connections ; the one in reference to pheno- 

 menal causation, the other to noumenal causation — to an underlying 

 " principle of activity." 



The simple statement of fact is that the phenomena of life are 

 data sui generis, and must as such be accepted by science. Just as 

 when oxygen and hydrogen combine to form water, new data for 

 science emerge, so, when protoplasm was evolved, new data emerged 

 which it is the business of science to study. In both cases we 

 believe that the results are due to the operation of natural laws, that 

 is to say, can, with adequate knowledge, be described in terms of 

 antecedence and sequence. But in both cases the results, which we 

 endeavour thus to formulate, are the outcome of principles of activity, 

 the mode of operation of which is inexplicable. We formulate the 

 laws of evolution in terms of antecedence and sequence ; we also 

 refer these laws to an underlying cause the noumenal mode of action 

 of which is inexplicable. This, if I interpret him rightly, is Mr 

 Spencer's meaning. 



The use of the phrase ' dynamic element in life ' is also open 

 to misconstruction. A dynamic element, as understood by science, 

 is a link in the phenomenal chain, and is expressed in terms of 

 the inter-relation of the parts of a material system, and of actu- 

 ally observed attractions and repulsions. But it is customary for 

 physicists to introduce at the outset of their discourse definitions 

 of force as the cause or raison d'etre of motion. These are now com- 

 monly regarded as a pious tribute to the noumenal, like grace before 

 meat, and independent of physics in its strictly scientific aspect. 

 But since such a definition of force not infrequently stands in the 

 fore front of a treatise on dynamics, it may be regarded, noumenal 

 though it be, as a dynamical postulate. It is in this noumenal sense 

 that the term ' dynamic ' is used in Mr Spencer's phrase. It is, 

 we are told, a " principle of activity." And unless the reader is 

 careful to note the distinction, Mr Spencer's position will be open 

 to misconstruction. Vitalism is a philosophical conception ; and 

 the controversy which is suggested by the term is largely due to the 



