264 MENTAL CONSTITUTION OF ANIMALS. 



actions of children, especially in their moments of play, and 

 where their selfish feelings are concerned, bear a resemblance 

 to those of certain familiar animals. Behold then the wonder- 

 ful unity of the whole system. The grades of mind, like the 

 forms of being, are mere stages of development. In the 

 humbler forms, only a few of the mental faculties are traceable, 

 just as we see in them but a few of the lineaments of universal 

 structure. In man the system has arrived at its highest con- 

 dition. The few gleams of reason, then, which we see in the 

 lower animals, are precisely analogous to tuch a development 

 of the fore-arm as we find in the paddle of the whale. 

 Causality, comparison, and other of the noble faculties, are in 

 them rudimentaL 



Bound up as we thus are by an identity in the character of 

 our mental organization with the lower animals, we are yet, it 

 will be observed, strikingly distinguished from them by this 

 great advance in development. We have faculties in full force 

 and activity which the animals either possess not at all, or in 

 so low and obscure a form as to be equivalent to non-existence. 

 Now these parts of mind are those which connect us with the 

 things that are not of this world. We have veneration, 

 prompting us to the worship of the Deity, which the animals 

 lack. We have hope, to carry us on in thought beyond the 

 bounds of time. We have reason, to enable us to inquire 

 into the character of the Great Father, and the relation 

 of us, his humble creatures, towards him. We have conscien- 

 tiousness and benevolence, by which we can in a faint and 

 humble measure imitate, in our conduct, that which he exem- 

 plifies in the whole of his wondrous doings. The existence of 

 faculties having a regard to such things is a good evidence that 

 such things exist. The face of God is reflected in the organi- 

 zation of man, as a little pool reflects the glorious sun. 



The effective or sentimental faculties are all of them liable 

 to operate whenever appropriate objects or stimuli are presented, 

 and this they do as irresistibly and unerringly as the tree 

 sucks up moisture which it requires, with only this exception, 

 that one faculty interferes with the action of another, and 

 operates instead, by force of superior inherent strength or 

 temporary activity. For example, alimentiveness may be in 

 powerful operation with regard to its appropriate object, pro- 

 ducing a keen appetite, and yet it may not act, in consequence 

 of the more powerful operation of cautiousness, warning against 

 evil consequences likely to ensue from the desired indulgence. 



