A MODERN "SYMPOSIUM." 



39 



Blachford for a happy illustration of my own 

 meaning. But it is he who expects the tune to 

 exist without the fiddle. / say, you can't have a 

 tunc without a fiddle, nor a fiddle without wood. 



III. I luve reserved the criticism of Prof. 

 Huxley, because it lies apart from the principal 

 discussion, and turns mainly on some incidental 

 remarks of mine on " biological reasoning about 

 spiritual things." 



I note three points at the outset. Prof. Hux- 

 ley does not himself pretend to any evidence for 

 a theological soul and future life. Again, he 

 does not dispute the account I give of the func- 

 tional relation of physical and moral facts. He 

 seems surprised that I should understand it, not 

 being a biologist ; but he is kind enough to say 

 that my statement may pass. Lastly, he does 

 not deny the reality of man's posthumous activ- 

 ity. Now, these three are the main purposes of 

 my argument ; and in these I have Prof. Huxley 

 with me. He is no more of a theologian than 

 I am. Indeed, he is only scandalized that I 

 should see any good in priests at all. He might 

 have said more plainly that, when the man is 

 dead, there is an end of the matter. But this 

 clearly is his opinion, and he intimates as much 

 in his paper. Only he would say no more about 

 it, bury the carcass, and end the tale, leaving all 

 thoughts about the future to those whose faith is 

 more robust and whose hopes are richer ; by 

 which I understand him to mean persons weak 

 enough to listen to the priests. 



Now, this does not satisfy me. I call it ma- 

 terialism, for it exaggerates the importance of 

 the physical facts, and ignores that of the spir- 

 itual facts. And the object of my paper was 

 simply this : that as the physical facts are daily 

 growing quite irresistible, it is of urgent impor- 

 tance to place the spiritual facts on a sound sci- 

 entific basis at once. Prof. Huxley implies that 

 his business is with the physical facts, and the 

 spiritual facts must take care of themselves. I 

 cannot agree with him. That is precisely the 

 difference between us. The spiritual facts of 

 man's nature are the business of all who under- 

 take to denounce priestcraft, and especially of 

 those who preach " Lay Sermons." 



Prof. Huxley complains that I should join in 

 the view-halloo against biological science. Now, 

 I never have supposed that biological science 

 was in the positio:: of the hunted fox. I thought 

 it was the hunter, booted and spurred and riding 

 over us all, with Prof. Huxley leaping the most 

 terrific gates and cracking his whip with intense 

 gusto. As to biological science, it is the last 



thing that I should try to run down ; and I must 

 protest, with all sincerity, that I wrote without a 

 thought of Prof. Huxley at all. He insists on 

 knowing, in the most peremptory way, of whom 

 I was thinking, as if I were thinking of him. 

 Of whom else could I be thinking, forsooth, when 

 1 spoke of biology ? Well ! I did not bite my 

 thumb at him, but I bit my thumb. 



Seriously, I was not writing at Prof. Huxley, 

 or I should have named him. I have a very 

 great admiration for his work in biology ; I have 

 learned much from him ; I have followed his 

 courses of lectures years and years ago, and 

 have carefully studied his books. If, in ques- 

 tions which belong to sociology, morals, and to 

 general philosophy, he seems to me hardly an 

 authority, why need we dispute ? Dog should 

 not bite dog ; and he and I have many a wolf 

 that we both would keep from the fold. 



But, if I did not mean Prof. Huxley, whom 

 did I mean ? Now, my paper, I think clearly 

 enough, alluded to two very different kinds of 

 materialism. There is systematic materialism, 

 and there is the vague materialism. The emi- 

 nent example of the first is the unlucky remark 

 of Cabanis that the brain secretes thought, as 

 the liver secretes bile ; and there is much of the 

 same sort in many foreign theories — in the tone 

 of Moleschott, Biichner, and the like. The most 

 distinct examples of it in this country are found 

 among phrenologists, spiritualists, some mental 

 pathologists, and a few communist visionaries. 

 The far wider, vaguer, and more dangerous school 

 of materialism is found in a multitude of quar- 

 ters — in all those who insist exclusively on the 

 physical side of moral phenomena— all, in short, 

 who, to use Prof. Huxley's phrase, are employed 

 in " building up a physical theory of moral phe- 

 nomena." Those who confuse moral and physical 

 phenomena are indeed few. Those who exag- 

 gerate the physical side of phenomena are many. 



Now, though I did not allude to Prof. Huxley 

 in what I wrote, his criticism convinces me that 

 he is sometimes at least found among these last. 

 His paper is an excellent illustration of the very 

 error which I condemned. The issue between us 

 is this : We both agree that every mental and 

 moral fact is in functional relation with some 

 molecular fact. So far we are entirely on the 

 same side, as against all forms of theological and 

 metaphysical doctrine which conceive the possi- 

 bility of human feeling without a human body. 

 But, then, says Prof. Huxley, if I can trace 

 the molecular facts which are the antecedents 

 of the mental aud moral facts, I have explained 



