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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



with her unity and indivisibility forever se- 

 cured. 



This it is that serves as a criterion of the 

 public opinion of the Hungarian nation. This, 

 and not an inflamed sentimentality, sympathetic 

 or antipathetic, is the starting-point of the con- 

 viction, that dikes should be raised against the 

 Russian extension ; for, if we do it not, we expose 

 our fatherland and the monarchy, whose interests 

 in this respect are identical, to the necessary con- 

 sequence that the Russian power, increased al- 

 ready by the dismemberment of Poland to formid- 

 able proportions, would attack, after this new aug- 

 mentation of force, the Austro-Hungarian mon- 

 archy as a boa-constrictor that compresses her 

 giant folds around the body of her prey, or as a 

 hundred-armed polypus that screws itself into the 

 flesh. 



That this would be the unavoidable conse- 

 quence of Russian extension cannot be doubted, 

 considering the geographical position and ethno- 

 graphical situation of the Austro-Hungarian mon- 

 archy. 



Then it will no more be a question of the 

 Hungarian race — reduced by the Russophiles 

 only to four millions of inhabitants ; it will be a 

 question whether Hungary shall remain Hungary. 



And now it is necessary to point out a dan- 

 gerous network which already hangs around us. 

 This network is knitted out of that erroneous 

 conception that the power of Russia can only be- 

 come dangerous to us by territorial occupation. 



They say : " The czar has given his word that 

 he will not occupy ; and the czar is an honest 

 man " (Brutus is an honorable man) ; " let him 

 then manage " (I very nearly wrote mismanage) 

 " in the East. The present vocation of the Aus- 

 tro-Hungarian monarchy is to remain in readi- 

 ness" (and, of course, only in the south, where 

 we can do mischief to the Turks, but in no ima- 

 ginable case to the Russians), " and only to step 

 into action if the czar should break his word, and 

 want to occupy while the peace negotiations last. 

 Oh ! then we shall draw out the sword from the 

 scabbard, and then we shall do — this and that." 



The nation should be on its guard against this 

 network. It is a very dangerous network. 



1. I say, if the czar should come out victo- 

 riously from this war, then the Vienna cabinet 

 will not draw the sword to impede the czar in 

 his occupation, but only that it may participate 

 in the booty. God save our poor country from 

 this suicidal tingling of swords, where infamy 

 would cover the suicide ! But let us keep also 



in mind that God protects only those who defend 

 themselves. 



2. I say, even if the Viennese cabinet would 

 impede at such a time the Russian occupation, it 

 would not find a single ally to assist it to over- 

 throw an accomplished fact, such as it could se- 

 cure at present if it wished it, for the far easier 

 task of preventing Russian occupation from be- 

 coming an accomplished fact. Frussia would not 

 help her out of this difficulty with Russia ; France 

 would not help her ; Italy would not help her. 

 The Vienna cabinet would then have, not an ally 

 more, but a mighty ally less, one who under given 

 circumstances would prove better than any other, 

 and this is the Turk. We should lose him by yon 

 network policy ; we should lose him without re- 

 placing him by any other. We should lose him, 

 whether the czar occupied territory or not. In 

 the case of his raising army after army against 

 the forsaken Turks, and finally conquering them 

 — then, of course, a Turkish alliance would be 

 out of the question. Or if the Turk, losing pa- 

 tience at the foul play of Europe, and above all 

 of the Vienna cabinet, should say, " Well, if Eu- 

 rope, and especially the Vienna cabinet, does not 

 care for me, I do not care for them either," and 

 should sign a separate peace with Russia — then 

 the Vienna cabinet might stare at yon wooden 

 idol, chiseled by its own political wisdom, and 

 write protocols, which would be " set aside " by 

 the "world's judge," History, as has always hap- 

 pened. 



Thus this policy of looking out for the keep- 

 ing or not keeping of the czar's word is either 

 bad calculation or criminal calculation ; either 

 crime or folly. Take your choice. 



But there is a still more decisive view for us. 

 This is, that the menacing danger for the Austro- 

 Hungarian Empire would not be removed even if 

 the czar kept his word and did not occupy ; for, 

 even if he did not occupy, but terminated the 

 war victoriously, the fact that he had conquered 

 would secure for him the power of leadership — 

 that dictatorial influence which is his designed 

 aim, and is written on his banner as "The Sla- 

 vonic Cause." And for the Austro-Hungarian 

 monarchy the danger is not greater from the czar 

 extending his power by occupation than it would 

 be if he showed by victory that he can be a 

 mighty stronghold of " The Slavonic Cause," and 

 thus extend his influence over the Eastern Slavo- 

 nians and over those that are with them in the . 

 same camp— viz., our neighbors on the left hand, 

 as well as those on the right hand, and also in 

 our own country. These he could dispose of as 



