322 



THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



" It is sometimes said that all propositions 

 whatever, of which the predicate is a general 

 name, do, in point of fact, affirm or deny resem- 

 blance. All such propositions affirm that a thing 

 belongs to a class ; but things being classed to- 

 gether according to their resemblance, everything 

 is of course classed with the things which it is 

 supposed to resemble most ; and thence, it may be 

 said, when we affirm that gold is a metal, or that 

 Socrates is a man, the affirmation intended is, that 

 gold resembles other metals, and Socrates other 

 men, more nearly than they resemble the objects 

 contained in any other of the classes coordinate 

 with these." 



Of this doctrine Mill goes on to speak in the 

 following curious remarks, 1 to which I particular- 

 ly invite the reader's attention : 



" There is some slight degree of foundation 

 for this remark, but no more than a slight degree. 

 The arrangement of things into classes, such as 

 the class metal, or the class man, is grounded in- 

 deed on a resemblance among the things which 

 are placed in the same class, but not on a mere 

 general resemblance : the resemblance it is ground- 

 ed on consists in the possession by all those things, 

 of certain common peculiarities ; and those peculi- 

 arities it is which the terms connote, and which 

 the propositions consequently assert ; not the re- 

 semblance. For though when I say, Gold is a 

 metal, I say by implication that if there be any 

 other'mefals it must resemble them, yet if there 

 were no other metals I might still assert the prop- 

 osition with the same meaning as at present, 

 namely, that gold has the various properties im- 

 plied in the word metal ; just as it might be said, 

 Christians are men, even if there were no men 

 who were not Christians. Propositions, there- 

 fore, in which objects are referred to a class be- 

 cause they possess the attributes constituting the 

 class, are so far from asserting nothing but resem- 

 blance, that they do not, properly speaking, assert 

 resemblance at all." 



I have long wondered at the confusion of ideas 

 which this passage exhibits. We are told that I 

 the arrangement of things in a class is founded 

 on a resemblance between the things, but not a 

 "mere general resemblance," whatever this may 

 mean. It is grounded on the possession of cer- 

 tain "common peculiarities." I pass by the 

 strangeness of this expression ; I should have 

 thought that common peculiarity is a self-contra- 

 dictory expression in its own terms; but here it 

 seems to mean merely attribute or qualify. The 

 terms then connote this attribute, rot the resem- 

 blance. Here we are in direct and absolute con- 

 flict with Mill's previous statement that attribute 



1 Same section, third paragraph. 



is precisely that similarity — that common some- 

 thing — which gives a meaning to the general name, 

 and that the names of attributes are, in their ul- 

 timate analysis, names for the resemblances of our 

 sensations. Previously he said that " every gen- 

 eral name " connotes one or more of these resem- 

 blances ; now he says that it is " these peculiari- 

 ties " which the terms connote, and which the 

 propositions consequently assert, not the resem- 

 blances. But these peculiarities are common pecu- 

 liarities — that is, common qualities or attributes. 

 The self-contradiction is absolute and complete, 

 except, indeed, so far as Mill admits that there is 

 " some slight degree of foundation " for the re- 

 mark which he is controverting. 



We will afterward consider what is this slight 

 degree of foundation ; but proceeding for the 

 present with the interpretation of the remarkable 

 passage quoted, we learn that when I say, " Gold 

 is a metal," I may imply that if there are other 

 metals it must resemble them ; yet, if there were 

 no other metals, I might still assert that gold has 

 the various properties implied in the word metal. 

 The " Law of Obliviscence" seems to have been 

 at work here ; Mill must have quite forgotten that 

 he was speaking of propositions, " of which the 

 predicate is a general name," or the name of a 

 class. Now if, as Mill sometimes holds, a class 

 consists only of the things in it, 1 there must be 

 more metals than gold, else metal would not be a 

 general name. If, as Mill elsewhere says, to the 

 contrary effect, the class may exist whether the 

 things exist or not," we still have him on the other 

 horn of the dilemma ; for then the meaning of 

 the general name must consist in its connotation, 

 which consists of attributes, which are but another 

 name for resemblances. Yet, forsooth, the propo- 

 sition does not, properly speaking, assert resem- 

 blances at all. 



The important passage quoted above is, as we 

 might readily expect, inconsistent with various 

 other statements in the " System of Logic," as, for 

 instance, most of the seventh section of the chap- 

 ter on "Definition," where we are told 3 that the 

 philosopher " only gives the same name to things 

 which resemble one another in the same definite 

 particulars," and that the inquiry into a defini- 

 tion 4 "is an inquiry into the resemblances and 

 differences among those things" Elsewhere we 



i " System of Logic," Book II., chapter ii., section 

 2, fourth paragraph. 



s Book 1., chapter vii., section 1, first paragraph. 



s Book I. , chapter viii., section?, paragraph 4, about 

 the seventeenth line. This section is numbered 8 in 

 some of the early editions. 



* Same section, paragraph 8, line 7. 



