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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT 



semblance, forsooth, because there might be no 

 other metal but gold. Yet metal is spoken of as 

 a class, so that the word metal is a class-name, 

 and the whole discussion refers to propositions 

 of which the predicates are general names. 



The fact is, the passage contains more than 

 one non-sequitur ; it tacitly assumes that metal 

 might continue to be a class-name, while there 

 was only one kind of metal, so that there would 

 be nothing else to resemble. Then there is an- 

 other non-sequitur when Mill proceeds straight- 

 way to another example, thus — "just as it might 

 be said, Christians are men, even if there were 

 no men who were not Christians." The words 

 "just as " here mean that this example bears 

 cut the last ; but Christians and men being 

 plural, the predicate men is now clearly a class- 

 name, and the meaning is that Christians all re- 

 semble each other in the attributes connoted by 

 the class-name man. Mill adds, indeed, the 

 words " even if there were no men who were not 

 Christians." Here is unquestionable confusion 

 of thought. Man is a class-name and connotes 

 the definite resemblances of the objects in the 

 class, even if the class happens to be coextensive 

 with the class Christians. If I say, " Men are 

 capable of laughter," the general predicate " ca- 

 pable of laughter" connotes a character in which 

 men resemble each other, even though there be 

 no beings capable of laughter who are not men. 

 Thus, when we closely examine the passage in 

 question, it falls to pieces ; it has no logical co- 

 herence. 1 



I may remark incidentally that it is strange 

 to meet, in a discussion of the fundamental prin- 

 ciples of logic and knowledge, with things which 

 have a slight degree of foundation. The element- 

 ary principles of a science either are true or are 

 not true. There is no middle term. Degree in 

 such matters is out of place. But in Mill's philo- 

 sophical works, as I shall have various opportuni- 

 ties to show, there is a tendency to what may be 

 called philosophical trimming. Instead of saying 

 outright that a thing is false, he says too fre- 

 quently that it is " not strictly true," as in the 

 case referring to the primary ideas of geometry 

 quoted in my last article. Mill's opinions, in 

 fact, so frequently came into conflict with each 

 other, that he acquired the habit of leaving a lit- 



1 In my own opinion, an affirmative proposition 

 assert* resemblance in its highest degree, i. e., iden- 

 tity, even when the subject and predicate are singular 

 terms ; but to prevent confusion, I argue the question 

 on Mill's assumption that the predicate is a general or 

 class name. 



tie room to spare in each of his principal state- 

 ments : they required a good deal of fitting to- 

 gether. Now " the slight degree of foundation " 

 for the remark that propositions, of which the 

 predicate is a general name, do assert resem- 

 blance, seems to be explained in the two para- 

 graphs which follow that quoted, and these we 

 will now consider. 



Mill proceeds to remark x that there is some- 

 times a convenience in extending the boundaries 

 of a class so as to include things which possess 

 in a very inferior degree, if in any, some of the 

 characteristic properties of the class, provided 

 that they resemble that class more than any 

 other. He refers to the systems of classification 

 of living things, in which almost every great 

 family of plants or animals has a few anomalous 

 genera or species on its borders, which are ad- 

 mitted by a kind of courtesy. It is evident, 

 however, that a matter of this sort has nothing 

 to do with the fundamental logical question wheth- 

 er propositions assert resemblance or not. This 

 paragraph is due to the ambiguity of the word 

 resemblance, which here seems to mean vague or 

 slight resemblance, as distinguished from that in- 

 contestable resemblance which enables us to say 

 that things have the same attribute. In fact, a 

 very careful reader of the sections in which Mill 

 treats of resemblance will find that there is fre- 

 quent confusion between definite resemblance, 

 and something which Mill variously calls " mere 

 general resemblance " or " vague resemblance," 

 which will usually refer to similarities depending 

 on the degree of qualities, or the form of ob- 

 jects. 



There is, however, a second case bearing out 

 Mill's opinion that there is " some slight degree 

 of foundation " for the remark that propositions 

 whose predicates are general terms affirm resem- 

 blance. This is a matter into which we must in- 

 quire with some care, so that I give at full length 

 the paragraph relating to it : s 



" There is still another exceptional case, in 

 which, though the predicate is the name of a 

 class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but 

 resemblance, that class being founded not on re- 

 semblance in any given particular, but on general 

 unanalyzable resemblance. The classes in ques- 

 tion are those into which our simple sensations, or 

 rather simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of 

 white, for instance, are classed together, not be- 

 cause we can take them to pieces, and say they 

 are alike in this, and not alike in that, but because 



1 Book I., chapter v., section C. fourth paragraph. 



2 Book I., chapter v., section 6, paragraph 5. 



