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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



other red flower in color, the general resemblance 

 has been analyzed and found to consist in a spe- 

 cific resemblance of color to color. If I see an 

 orange, I know it to be an orange, because it 

 resembles similar fruits which I have often heard 

 so called. In the first instance, the resemblance 

 may be to my mind mere general resemblance ; 

 that is to say, I may not devote separate atten- 

 tion to the several points of resemblance. But 

 if one asks me why I call it an orange, I must 

 analyze my feeling of resemblance, and I then 

 discover that the color of the fruit resembles the 

 color of fruit formerly called oranges, and that in 

 regard to the form, the texture of the surface, the 

 hardness, the smell, and so forth, there are other 

 resemblances. My knowledge, as Prof. Bain 

 says, finally resolves itself into differences and 

 agreements. But the agreements in question are 

 precisely those resemblances — the base-work of 

 all knowledge — which Mill dismisses as still an- 

 other exceptional case. 



There is really no mystery or perplexity in 

 the matter, except such as Mill has created by 

 the perversity of bis intellect. Mill has made 

 that into a species, which is really the summum 

 genus of knowledge. Locke truly pronounced 

 knowledge to consist in the perception of agree- 

 ment or repugnance of our ideas, and Prof. Bain 

 has stated the same view with a force and dis- 

 tinctness which leave nothing to be desired. 

 But Mill, strange to say, has treated this all- 

 fundamental relation among "The Remaining 

 Laws of Nature," " Minor Matters of Fact," or 

 "Exceptional Cases." It is usually impossible 

 to trace the causes which led to Mill's perversi- 

 ties, but, in this important case, it is easy to ex- 

 plain the peculiarity of his views on Resem- 

 blance. He was laboring under hereditary preju. 

 dice. His father, James Mill, in his most acute 

 but usually wrong-headed book, the "Analysis 

 of the Phenomena of the Human Mind," had 

 made still more strange mistakes. In several 

 curious passages the son argues that we cannot 

 resolve resemblance into anything simpler. These 

 needless arguments are evidently suggested by 

 parts cf the "Analysis" in which the father 

 professed to resolve resemblances into cases of 

 sequence ! 



Thus, when James Mill is discussing 1 the 

 "Association of Ideas," he objects to Hume 

 specifying Resemblance as one of the grounds 

 of association. He says : 



" Resemblance only remains, as an alleged 



1 "Analysis:" first edition, vol. i., p. 79; second 

 edition, vol. i., p. lit. 



principle of association, and it is necessary to in- 

 quire whether it is included in the laws which have 

 been above expounded. I believe it will be found 

 that we are accustomed to see like things togeth- 

 er. When we see a tree, we generally see more 

 trees than one ; when we see an ox, we generally 

 see more oxen than one ; a sheep, more 6heep 

 than one ; a man, more men than one. From this 

 observation, I think, we may refer resemblance to 

 the law of frequency, of which it seems to form a 

 particular case." 



I cannot help regarding the misapprehension 

 contained in this passage as perhaps the most 

 extraordinary one which could be adduced in the 

 whole range of philosophical literature. Resem- 

 blance is reduced to a particular case of the law 

 of frequency, that is, to the frequent recurrence 

 of the same thing, as when, in place of one man, 

 I see many men. But how do I know that they 

 are men, unless I observe that they resemble 

 each other ? It is impossible even to speak of 

 men without implying that there are various 

 things called men which resemble each other suf- 

 ficiently to be classed together and called by the 

 same name. Nevertheless James Mill seems to 

 have been actually under the impression that he 

 had got rid of resemblance ! 



Later on in the same work, 1 indeed, we have 

 the following statement : 



" It is easy to see, among the principles of as- 

 sociation, what particular principle it is, which is 

 mainly concerned in Classification, and by which 

 we are rendered capable of that mighty opera- 

 tion; on which, as its basis, the whole of our 

 intellectual structure is reared. That principle is 

 Resemblance. It seems to be similarity or re- 

 semblance which, when we have applied a name 

 to one individual, leads us to apply it to another, 

 and another, till the whole forms an aggregate, 

 connected together by the common relation of 

 every part of the aggregate to one and the same 

 name. Similarity, or Resemblance, we must re- 

 gard as an Idea familiar and sufficiently under- 

 stood for the illustration at present required. It 

 will itself be strictly analyzed, at a subsequent 

 part of this inquiry." 



In writing this passage, James Mill seems to 

 have forgotten, quite in the manner of his son, 

 that he had before treated Resemblance as an 

 alleged principle of association, and had referred 

 it to a particular case of the law of frequency. 

 Here it reappears as the principle on which the 

 whole of our intellectual structure is reared. It 

 is strange that so important a principle should 

 elsewhere be called an " alleged principle," and 



i "Analysis:" first edition, vol. i., pp. 212, 213; 

 second edition, vol. i., pp. 270, 271. 



