ON THE NATURE OF THINGS-IX-THEHSELYES. 



427 



human consciousness, having intelligence and vo- 

 lition. 



Suppose that I see a man looking at a caudle- 

 stick. Both of these are objects, or phenomena, 

 in my mind. An image of the candlestick, in the 

 optical sense, is formed upon his retina, and nerve- 

 messages go from all parts of this to form what 

 we may call a cerebral image somewhere in the 

 neighborhood of the optic thalami in the inside 

 of his brain. This cerebral image is a certain 

 complex of disturbances in the matter of these 

 organs ; it is a material or physical fact, there- 

 fore a group of my possible sensations, just as 

 the candlestick is. The cerebral image is an im- 

 perfect representation of the candlestick, corre- 

 sponding to it point for point in a certain way. 

 Both the candlestick and the cerebral image are 

 matter ; but one material complex represents the 

 other material complex in an imperfect way. 



Now the candlestick is not the external real- 

 ity whose existence is represented in the man's 

 mind ; for the candlestick is a mere perception 

 in my mind. Nor is the cerebral image the man's 

 perception of the candlestick ; for the cerebral 

 image is merely an idea of a possible perception 

 in my mind. But there is a perception in the 

 man's mind, which we may call the mental image ; 

 and this corresponds to some external reality. 

 The external reality bears the same relation to the 

 mental image that the {phenomenal) candlestick 

 bears to the cerebral image. Now the candlestick 

 and the cerebral image are both matter ; they are 

 made of the same stuff. Therefore the external 

 reality is made of the same stuff as the man's 

 perception or mental image, that is, it is made 

 of mind-stuff. And as the cerebral image repre- 

 sents imperfectly the candlestick, in the same way 

 and to the same extent the mental image repre- 

 sents the reality external to his consciousness. 

 Thus, in order to find the thing in itself which is 

 represented by any object in my consciousness 

 such as a candlestick, I have to solve this question 

 in proportion, or rule of three : 



As the physical configuration of my cerebral 

 image of the object 



is to the physical configuration of the object, 



so is my perception of the object (the object 



regarded as complex of my feelings) 

 to the thing in itself. 



Hence we are obliged to identify the thing-in- 

 itself with that complex of elementary mind-stuff 

 which on other grounds we have seen reason to 

 think of as going along with the material object. 

 Or to say the same thing in other words, the real- 

 ity external to our minds which is represented in 

 our minds as matter, is in itself mind-stuff. 



The universe, then, consists entirely of mind- 

 stuff. Some of this is woven into the complex 

 form of human minds containing imperfect rep- 

 resentations of the mind-stuff outside them, and 

 of themselves also, as a mirror reflects its own 

 image in another mirror, ad infinitum. Such an 

 imperfect representation is called a material uni- 

 verse. It is a picture in a man's mind of the 

 real universe of mind-stuff. 



The two chief points of this doctrine may be 

 thus summed up : 



Matter is a mental picture in which mind-stuff 

 is the thing represented. 



Reason, intelligence, and volition, are proper- 

 ties of a complex which is made up of elements 

 themselves not rational, not intelligent, not con- 

 scious. 



Note.— The doctrine here expounded appears 

 to have been arrived at independently by many 

 persons ; as was natural, seeing that it is (or seems 

 to me) a necessary consequence of recent advances 

 in the theory of perception. Kant threw out a sug- 

 gestion that the Ding-an sich might be of the na- 

 ture of mind ; but the first statement of the doctrine 

 in its true connection that I know of, is by "Wundt. 

 Since it dawned on me, some time ago, I have sup- 

 posed myself to find it more or less plainly hinted 

 in many writings ; but the question is one in which 

 it is peculiarly difficult to make out precisely what 

 another man means, and even what one means 

 one's self. 



Some writers (e. g., Dr. Tyndall) have used the 

 word matter to mean the phenomenon plus the 

 reality represented ; and there are many reasons 

 in favor of such usage in general. But for the 

 purposes of the present discussion I have thought 

 it clearer to use the word for the phenomenon as 

 distinguished from the thing- in-itself. —Mind. 



