robison] ■ PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE-STUDY 207 



only by manual training in such potential opportunities, have 

 not our writers quite largely taken this social activity for granted 

 as a part of the instruments for certain disciplinary ends, and do 

 they not seem to have failed to view such participation as a 

 social end in itself? It is as if nature-study must not lag behind 

 any other study in claims to disciplinary value; when in fact 

 we are not sure that much that is ascribed to discipline is not 

 really a matter of selection. 



Both aims and theory are still in a chaotic state, and are in need 

 of a master's treatment. Some of the aims, as practically ex- 

 pressed by superintendents in a large number of courses of study, 

 are not the peculiar possession of this branch of the curriculum. 

 Some are trivial. Some are vigorously called into question by 

 recent experimental psychology, such as the supposed training 

 of various general "powers" or "faculties" of the mind by exer- 

 cise in narrow limits. This "training" has been so exalted that 

 the real thing of nature as such becomes a subsidiary matter, a 

 mere tool, and leads to a disregard of the question of whether it 

 has worth in itself, either from the standpoint of society in 

 general or of the immediate world of the child. Psychologists hold 

 that the amount of improvement in a general ability resulting 

 from practice within narrow limits depends on the elements 

 common to all the acts of observation. Is it true, as suggested 

 by some psychologists, that these are much fewer than com- 

 monly supposed, and therefore, that there is not the general 

 improvement so generally claimed? 



Who will rise up and determine these common elements, and 

 with carefully devised units, measure the amount of improve- 

 ment ? Exact studies have been made in memory, sense dis- 

 crimination, and muscular activities. More or less successful 

 efforts have been made to measure quantitatively the relation 

 between certain methods of teaching and the results in spelling 

 and arithmetic. Why not in nature-study? Much of our 

 procedure must rest on such determinations or on faith. 



While some of the questions raised might be treated more at 

 length, these remarks are intended only to call attention to the 

 fact that, while the what is rather definitely understood, the 

 why leaves much to be desired, and that the how must be largely 

 conditioned on a clearly worked out rationale. 



