ARE LANGUAGES INSTITUTIONS? 



149 



jylanet^ that of intended, but palpably insufficient description ; in 

 Uranus and Neptune^ of learned and reflective selection, under gov- 

 ernment of the same regard for analogy which controls also the most 

 unconscious and popular choice of appellations ; and in decimal^ no 

 one has yet been skillful enough to find out what. But, known or un- 

 known, sufficient or insufficient, learned or popular, it is all one, so far 

 as regards the practical uses of speech ; when once established in use, 

 the name, from whencesoever derived, is good enough for its office. 

 It were vain indeed to be particular about the source, when the use is 

 going to depend, with each new learner, on an artificially-formed as- 

 sociation alone. 



Now, how should it enter into the mind of any one to regard words 

 thus won, thus kept in life, thus liable to alterations of every kind in 

 the mouths of their speakers, as any thing more than the instruments, 

 the outward equipment, of thought ? Thought is the action of the 

 mind, in apprehending, compai'ing, inferring ; every word is an act of 

 the body, and of the body only ; performed, indeed, as all the volun- 

 tary acts of the body are, under the direction of the mind, but no 

 more the work of the mind than are crooks of a finger, or brandish- 

 ings of an arm, or kicks with a foot. Thex'e is no more immediate 

 connection of the apparatus of thought with the muscles of utterance 

 than with those of facial expression or of gesture. Talking is just 

 as much thought as dancing is ; not one whit more. All the argu- 

 ments used to show the impossibility of mind-work without speech 

 are, so far as I can see, such as would also prove the impossibility of 

 manual work without tools and machines, of mathematical work with- 

 out written signs. 



If it be asked how the mind comes to equip itself with this instru- 

 mentality, the answer is ready and easy : it does so under the impulse 

 to communication. That language should owe its origin and mainte- 

 nance to a cause so extraneous to the soul, and so superficial, is repug- 

 nant to the prejudices of many ; yet I do not see how the truth of the 

 doctrine can be successfully controverted. It is in accordance with 

 all that we know of the history and present use of language, and, not 

 less, with all that we know of the development of man's powers in 

 other departments. Through all its existence, speech is primarily 

 and above all a social possession, its unity made and preserved by 

 mutual intelligibility, all its items and their changes requii'ing the 

 adoption of a community before they become language at all. Those 

 who, by isolation or physical defect, are cut oflF from communication 

 with their fellows, do not speak, and have no inclination to speak. 

 And, especially, communication is the only inducement to which every 

 human being, at every grade of culture, is fully accessible. The great 

 majority, even of speaking, civilized men, do not realize that language 

 is any thing to them but a means of communication ; and to ascribe 

 to the uncultivated man a power to foresee that expression will furnish 



