ARE LANGUAGES INSTITUTIONS? 153 



guage begins his work upon the signs, their office, and their history. 

 Between liim and the students of the other branches named there is a 

 relation of mutual helpfulness. The history of words and the history 

 of things cast constant and valued light uj^on one another. The 

 sounds of language illustrate the articulate capacity of the organs of 

 utterance, and their changes require for explanation a knowledge of 

 phonetic science, as a special department of physiology and acoustics 

 combined. And the contributions of language to psychology greatly 

 outweigh in value those of psychology to the science of language, 

 since the latter is the key to the historical development of human 

 thought ; and since words are not the immediate product of processes 

 of cognition, or abstraction, or induction, but only the result of vol- 

 untary attempts to communicate those products. Most students of 

 language, probably, believe all this, and act in their studies upon the 

 belief; only they are too uncertain of their ground not to be often 

 driven from it by the imposing claims of outsiders. 



About eight years ago (in the autumn of 1867), I put forth a con- 

 nected and carefully-reasoned exhibition of my linguistic views, in a 

 volume entitled " Language, and the Study of Language ; " in it I 

 dealt only sparingly in controversial discussions of others' opinions, 

 but left my own to recommend themselves by their concinnity, their 

 accordance with familiar facts, and their power to solve the various 

 problems which the science presents. Of the reception accorded to 

 that volume I have no right to complain, and certainly I never have 

 complained. But I have, at about that time and since, repeatedly 

 taken occasion to examine narrowly and criticise freely the opposing 

 views of others, and the arguments by which these were supported. 

 And I have done it especially in the case of men of eminence and 

 celebrity, men to whom the public are accustomed to look for guid- 

 ance on this class of subjects. This, surely, was neither unnatural 

 nor improper. What Smith, Brown, and Robinson, may say about 

 language before ears that heed them not, is of the smallest conse- 

 quence; but if Schleicher and Steinthal, Renan and Miiller, are teach- 

 ing what appears to me to be error, and sustaining it by untenable 

 arguments, I am not only authorized, but called upon, to refute them, 

 if I can. The last of the gentlemen just named, however, in his pa- 

 per in the Contemporary Review for January last (p. 312, et seq.), even 

 while very flatteringly intimating that my habit of criticising only the 

 most worthy of notice is appreciated, and hence that those criticised 

 feel in a certain way complimented by it, appears to think that their 

 greatness ought to shield them from such attacks. I have very little 

 fear that the general opinion of scholars will sustain him in this posi- 

 tion. Each controversy is to be judged, rather, on its own intrinsic 

 merits. If I have failed to make out a tolerable case against those 

 whom I have criticised, then, be they great men or small, I have 

 been guilty of presumption, and deserve reproof; if, on the contrary. 



