AGNOSTICISM IN HUXLEY'S HUME. 485 



than can be advanced in behalf of the assassination of Julius Crcsar, 

 or the best-authenticated occurrences in ancient times. They show, 

 secondly, that there is an accumulation and a combination of evidence in 

 favor of the life and mission of Jesus Christ : in the prophecies uttered 

 ages before ; in the results that followed the propagation of the gospel ; 

 and, above all, in the fitness of Christ's work to remedy the acknowl- 

 edged evils in the world, and in its adaptation to the felt wants, moral 

 and spiritual, of man. It might be shown that the cumulated evidence 

 in behalf of the Christian revelation is not unlike that brought to jDrove 

 the uniformity of nature. 



10. Professor Huxley has nothing original to advance on the sub- 

 ject of moral good. Neither of them holds the selfish theory of morals. 

 Both hold that man has a native instinct which leads him to sympa- 

 thize with his neighbor, and to be pleased at seeing him happy. So 

 far both are right; but, on the very same ground on which it is shown 

 that there is a disposition in our nature to promote the pleasure of 

 others, it can be shown that there is a principle in our nature which 

 leads us to approve of what is good and condemn what is evil. 



We are now in a position to. discover and comprehend what ag- 

 nosticism is, as expounded by its eminent living philosopher. Not- 

 withstanding the meaning of the term, it is claimed by the whole 

 school that there is knowledge gradually accumulating. According to 

 our professor there are sensations, there are pleasures and pains, and 

 among these are relations of coexistence, of succession, and similarity. 

 By observing these we may form science, which is systematized knowl- 

 edge. He who is master of the sciences is a learned man, and may 

 be very proud or vain of his acquirements. Professor Huxley, as be- 

 ing acquainted with a number of the sciences, is undoubtedly possessed 

 of much knowledge. 



What, then, it may be asked, is defective or fault-worthy in the 

 philosophy of agnostics ? Its error lies in its avowed fundamental 

 principle that we know only impressions, or, as Kant expresses it, ap- 

 pearances, and do not know things either mental or material. All that 

 we know are impressions impressions recalled and impressions corre- 

 lated. The correlations constitute the various sciences. 



There are savants who have a large acquaintance with these impres- 

 sions and their correlations. But all the while they know nothing and 

 never can know, or come nearer knowing, the things thus appearing 

 and thus correlated as appearances if, indeed, there are any things. 

 It is not positively asserted that there are things, but it is certain, ac- 

 cording to Kant, followed by Spencer, that there are, unknown and 

 unknowable by man with his present faculties. It is curious to find 

 the metaphysical Hume and the physical Huxley at one on this point. 



In one sense Huxley is entitled to deny that he is a materialist. 

 He believes as little in the existence of matter as he does of mind. 



