486 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



But he does claim that the impressions which we call mental are pro- 

 duced by those we call material, namely, cerebral action. So far he is 

 a materialist, and the undoubted tendency of his philosophy is materi- 

 alistic he makes matter the basis even of mental action. He is not 

 like Hume a skeptic, for he does not affirm that there are no things : 

 all that he says is, that if they exist we can not know them ; or, rather, 

 that things known to us are merely impressions in the shape of sensa- 

 tions of sensations remembered and correlated. He is not an atheist, 

 not he ; he only says that we have no proof of the existence of God. 

 He is simply an honest agnostic not believing in mind, or in matter, 

 or in God. What is the tendency of such a system ? 



1. It makes us feel that we are in a world of illusions. I say illu- 

 sions, and not deceptions ; for, as Nature does not profess or promise 

 anything, it can not be charged with intentional deception. But then 

 we may be deceiving ourselves or deceiving others ; and agnostics 

 show that we are doing so. I maintain that it strips us of many of 

 our natural beliefs beliefs which men have entertained in all ages and 

 countries. The great body of mankind believe that they themselves, 

 and the objects they have to deal with, are more than impressions, and 

 that they are realities in a real world ; that there is matter that is solid, 

 that there is mind that thinks and feels, that we all possess a soul, and 

 that our neighbors also have souls. I am prepared to show that these 

 convictions are valid ; that we have the same evidence of a self think- 

 ing, and of body resisting our activity, as we have of the existence of 

 impressions. But suppose these convictions removed, and how do we 

 feel, and what have we left us ? 



Will we be apt to set a higher value on life when we know it to be 

 a mere bundle of impressions with unsubstantial ideas growing out of 

 them ? Will we take a deeper interest in our neighbors when we have 

 come to believe (theoretically, for to believe this practically is impos- 

 sible) that they too are a mere congeries of appearances? Will we be 

 disposed to do more for the world when we regard it as a set and 

 series of phantasmagoria bound by rigid uniformities of likeness, co- 

 existence, and succession ? Will we be more likely to feel that life is 

 worth living for, and that it is our duty to work for its good, when we 

 contemplate it as in fact a mere series of images which do not reflect 

 any reality ? Will not one hindrance to self-indulgence be removed 

 when we are made to acknowledge that sensations and pleasures are 

 realities, and that there are no others ? Will not one hindrance to 

 self-murder, which we may be tempted to commit when in trouble, be 

 removed when we are sure that we are merely stopping a series of sen- 

 sations ? Will the regret of the learned murderer be deepened when 

 he is told that he has merely laid an arrest on a few pulsations ? Will 

 the seducer be more likely to be kept from gratifying his lust when 

 the highest philosophy teaches him that the soul of his victim is a 

 mere collection of nerves ? Is the youth who has run in debt less like- 



