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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



and the sustained interest in the subject 

 necessary to deal with it adequately and 

 successfully. Mr. Spencer entered upon 

 this line of study in his youth, and has de- 

 voted his life to it. He has explored and 

 reorganized several of the great divisions 

 of science with reference to their ultimate 

 bearings upon the problem of scientific mo- 

 rality ; and he is undoubtedly the first to 

 work out the philosophical relations of the 

 sciences to a new system of ethical doctrine. 



In this brief notice of a work that re- 

 quires to be thoughtfully read, we can no 

 more than open the subject ; and this can 

 best be done by anticipating certain ques- 

 tions that will arise at the outset in the 

 minds of many readers. It will be said, in 

 the first place : " We know something about 

 morality, having often heard it expounded 

 and applied. It lays down the regulations 

 of behavior. Government enforces it by 

 its laws, and society rests upon it. It 

 seems a very practical, common -sense 

 thing that everybody can understand, as 

 we must all obey its injunctions; but what 

 on earth do you mean by ' scientific mo- 

 rality ' ? " 



The reply is, that " scientific morality " 

 is that kiud of morality which can give 

 valid reasons for its requirements. Science 

 stands in just the same relations to morality 

 that it does to every other kind of human 

 activity it explains it. Dyeing was long a 

 successful practical art ; but it consisted in 

 following a set of blind rules, and its opera- 

 tions were imperfect. Science explained it, 

 and gave principles instead of rules, which 

 gave the reason of many failures, and led to 

 greatly improved practice. In like manner 

 morality follows blind and arbitrary rules, 

 and its practice is notoriously imperfect. 

 Science will substitute intelligible principles 

 for these rules which will account for nu- 

 merous failures, and lead to better practice. 



The question may be answered in an- 

 other way. It is the object of Mr. Spencer's 

 present work to lay the foundations of an 

 ethical system that shall have the validity 

 and authority of scientific truth, by showing 

 that the principles of right and wrong in 

 human conduct are grounded in the consti- 

 tution of nature. It is obvious that, until 

 the order and course of nature were under- 

 stood, such an inquiry must have been un- 

 successful and impossible. Science alone 



explains that order, and therefore furnishes 

 the facts and truths that are necessary to 

 the investigation. But if science, by this 

 elucidation, has supplied the data from 

 which the principles of morality can be de- 

 rived, and its practice consequently perfect- 

 ed, the working out of the subject must 

 give us a " scientific morality." 



In the next place it will be asked : " What 

 has morality to do with evolution ? As the 

 best ethical maxims go back to a high an- 

 tiquity, and as, according to Mr. Buckle, 

 while the intellect is progressive, morals are 

 stationary, what possible relation can the 

 evolution theory have to ethics ? " Mr. Spen- 

 cer furnishes the answer to this question at 

 the very opening of his book, and in a way 

 which shows that, if evolution be true at 

 all, it has everything to do with morality. 



His first chapter is on " Conduct in 

 general," and he begins by illustrating the 

 truth that no correct idea can be formed of 

 a part without a knowledge of the whole to 

 which it belongs. A detached arm could 

 not be understood by a being ignorant of 

 the human body ; the moon's movements 

 can not be interpreted, except in connec- 

 tion with the movements of the solar system ; 

 a fragment of a sentence is unintelligible if 

 separated from the remainder. 



Morality deals with a certain kind of 

 human conduct, but this implies that there 

 is another kind, of which moral conduct is 

 but a part. Again, the term " human con- 

 duct " implies that there is a conduct mani- 

 fested by creatures other than human, so 

 that human conduct becomes a part of a 

 still larger whole. Conduct is defined as 

 actions adjusted to ends, and is displayed 

 in ever- varying degrees of simplicity and 

 complication throughout the entire scale of 

 animate being. Animals low in type, in 

 seeking food, adjust actions to ends, and, as 

 we rise through the series, such adjusted 

 actions become more varied, combined, and 

 perfect, until man is reached, when the ad- 

 justments become far more complex and in- 

 volved, and the ends attained more numer- 

 ous, varied, and remote. Mr. Spencer says : 

 " Complete comprehension of conduct is 

 not to be obtained by contemplating the 

 conduct of human beings only : we have to 

 regard this as a part of universal conduct 

 conduct as exhibited by all living creatures. 

 Just as, fully to understand the part of con- 



