75 6 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



that distinction as an instrument of social analysis. Comte, according to 

 his plan of pushing forward the ideas of each of the fundamental 

 sciences into the succeeding, had taken up the distinction in abstract 

 mechanics, and carried it first into biology, where it made his contrast 

 between anatomy and physiology structure and function. The next 

 step was to sociology, and led to the distinction of order and progress. 

 I confess that I never thought the three cases exactly parallel ; still, 

 however the distinction came, it was invaluable in sociology ; and 

 Comte's separation of the two interests social .order and social prog- 

 ress was a grand simplification of the subject, and a mighty advance 

 upon the historical and political philosophy of his predecessors and 

 contemporaries. The social statics he discussed briefly, as compared 

 with the magnitude of the topics, but indicated well enough what 

 these topics were ; the social dynamics enabled him to give free scope 

 to his doctrine of the Three Stages, and carry this out in a grand survey 

 of the historical development of mankind. Here, of course, he exposed 

 a wide front to criticism ; but, while numerous exceptions might be 

 taken to his interpretations of history, it was truly wonderful to see how 

 many facts seemed to fall in happily under his formulas. Mill, it will 

 be seen from the "Logic " (book vi., chapter x.), accepted the Three 

 Stages as an essential part of Comte's historical method, which method 

 he also adopts and expounds as the completion of the logic of soci- 

 ology. In our very first conversations, I remember how much he re- 

 gretted Comte's misappreciation of Protestantism ; and he strove in 

 the early part of their correspondence to make him see this. He also 

 endeavored to put him right on the specialty of England in the politi- 

 cal evolution. 



It is curious to observe that his altered estimate of Comte never 

 extended to the views appropriated from him on the method of social 

 science. The modifications in the later editions consisted mainly in 

 leaving out the high-pitched compliments to Comte in the first ; none 

 of the quotations are interfered with. I give a few examples of these 

 omissions. Referring to the latest edition, the eighth, on page 490, he 

 writes : " The only thinker who, with a competent knowledge of sci- 

 entific methods in general " ; in the first edition " The greatest living 

 authority on scientific methods in general." On page 506, line five 

 from bottom, before " To prove (in short)," the first edition has " It 

 is therefore well said of M. Comte." In page 512, line thirteen from 

 top, the words " but deem them " are followed in the first edition by 

 " with the single exception of M. Comte." In page 513, line nine from 

 top, after " up to the present time," a long sentence of reference to 

 Comte is left out. In page 530, line fourteen from top, after " at- 

 tempting to characterize," there is omitted the clause "but which 

 hitherto are to my knowledge exemplified nowhere but in the writings 

 of M. Comte." 



The distinction of statics and dynamics was carried by Mill into 



