MAN AND SCIENCE: A REPLY. 



61 



dence and insusceptible of demonstration. As 

 Mr. Lewes observes concerning metaphysic, " it 

 is not verifiable, therefore not refutable." ' Cre- 

 do quia impossibile est. Nothing can surpass the 

 credulity of some modern philosophers. The 

 speculations of Empedocles were sufficiently jus- 

 tifiable ; they dealt vaguely only with the " infi- 

 nite possibilities of mechanical events : " a but- in 

 these latter days, when inductive reasoning of 

 the sternest kind is supposed to be indispensable 

 in science, it seems almost too monstrous to be 

 believed, that the entire science of organic on- 

 tology should be based upon a principle, or 

 rather a phrase, which receives illustration from 

 no one solitary fact or observation in the entire 

 domain of natural history or paleontology. 3 



By the latest conclusions of the doctrines of 

 evolution, the important questions concerning 

 man's origin, nature, and destiny, are supposed 

 to be finally and definitively answered. As to 

 his origin, he is proximately the lineal descendant 

 of some extinct ape ; generally he is the result of 

 the " interaction of organism and environment 

 through countless ages past" 4 — the latest link in 

 an unbroken chain of mechanical development 

 from cosmic gas to the protogenes, from the proto- 

 genes to " our wormy ancestors,' 1 ' 1 5 from these to 

 the ascidian, and thence to the anthropoid apes — 

 Q. E. D. The destiny of the race is not establish- 

 ed with absolute certainty ; it may dwindle in in- 

 significance, like the gigantic reptiles of the 

 sandstone epoch, or it may disappear altogether, 

 to be replaced by some unknown and higher 

 order of intelligence. The destiny of the indi- 

 vidual, however, is obviously to be decomposed 

 into carbonic acid, water, and ammonia — to be 

 " resolved into the infinite azure," and to be 

 known no more — to have no more future per- 

 sonal existence than a consumed candle. 



Assuming these positions, our knowledge of 

 man's nature and of his relations to the universe 

 and his immediate environment follows natural- 

 ly, logically, and of necessity. From mechanical 

 interactions nothing can result but mechanical 



1 " History of Philosophy," vol. ii., p. 749. 



a See Lange, op. clt.. p. 13. 



3 We have certainly heard recently a good deal 

 about the pedigree of the horse as furnishing a com- 

 plete demonstration of the truth of the doctrine of evo- 

 lution. It is not possible at present to enter upon 

 this subject, further than to say that, however much 

 one may admire, one can scarcely envy the contented 

 state of mind that can be satisfied with such demon- 

 stration as this. 



* The "Belfast Address." 



6 Haeckel's " Anthropogenie," Vortrag, xvii. 



forces or energies. Man, being the product of 

 mechanical force, can only represent a unit in 

 " the great series of causes and effects which, in 

 unbroken continuity, composes that which is, 

 and has been, and shall be, the sum of exist- 

 ence." ' In fine, he is a machine, an automaton, 

 with no more real control over his actions than 

 has the planet over its motion around the sun — 

 with no more responsibility, for good or for evil, 

 than a steam-engine or a galvanic battery. 



But at this point an objector, startled by the 

 enormity of the conclusion to which he has been 

 led by an apparently scientific train of argument, 

 may say : " We all know that this is not true ; 

 therefore there is something wrong in your prem- 

 ises or your conclusions. We know that we can 

 exercise a choice between two or more lines of 

 conduct, that we are not always and irresisti- 

 bly impelled by our organic tendencies or by sur- 

 rounding circumstances. We know further that 

 we can elect to act in direct opposition to these by 

 a determined effort of the will ; and that we can 

 make this effort from what is called motive, be- 

 cause such an act is what we call right, and such 

 another is what we call wrong. All this we know 

 with a certainty that does not appertain to any 

 of our convictions otherwise derived. We should 

 distrust every evidence of sense rather than this 

 fundamental intuition ; and we are ready to put 

 this conviction to any test that you can suggest." 

 To which the philosopher replies : " In a certain 

 sense all this is true ; for instance, ' the united 

 voice of this assembly could not persuade me 

 that I have not, at this moment, the power to lift 

 my arm if I wish to do so. . . . But what about 

 the origin of the wish?'' 2 Your xoill, as you call 

 it, is but the symbol of the last position before 

 action of certain molecules, which point to a cer- 

 tain course of conduct, just for the same reason 

 that the hands of a clock point to the given hour, 

 viz., because the clock was wound up and con- 

 structed to do this ; and " my physical and intel- 

 lectual textures were woven for me, not by me." 3 

 It is, then, evident that there is no thoroughfare 

 in this direction ; nevertheless, the last word has 

 not yet been said, as will shortly appear. 



The history of this question is deserving of a 

 moment's attention. About two hundred and 

 fifty years ago, when physiology as a science of 

 accurate observation could scarcely be said to ex- 

 ist; Descartes, an illustrious mathematician and 



1 Prof. Huxley, in Fortnightly Review, November. 

 1874, p. 577. 



2 " Science and Man " in Fortnightly Review, No- 

 vember, 1877, p. 609. 



3 Ibid. 



