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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



from rigid induction ; he even inserts the words 

 " of course," as if no one could have failed to see 

 this. It must, therefore, be derived from "the 

 loose and uncertain mode of induction," with 

 which we shall have more to do. But, in the first 

 place, this treatment of the matter does not 

 square with that in chapter iii., where he treats 

 of the same subject, "The Ground of Induction." 

 Here he told us, as already quoted, that the uni- 

 formity of the course of Nature is "our warrant 

 for all inferences from experience." Now, even " a 

 loose and uncertain mode of induction " must be 

 a case of inference from experience. Again, Mill 

 distinctly says, 1 "The statement that the uni- 

 formity of the course of Nature is the ultimate 

 major premise in all cases of induction, may be 

 thought to require some explanation." Here he 

 speaks without qualification of "all cases of in- 

 duction," which must include even the loose in- 

 duction of the ancients. In writing this chapter 

 Mill had not yet discovered that, as induction is 

 based upon causation, causation would have to be 

 based upon something else. Accordingly, though 

 in the third paragraph of the second section of 

 the chapter he mentions the " loose " induction 

 of the ancients, it is only to depreciate and almost 

 deride it. He thinks it was above all by pointing 

 out the insufficiency of this rude and loose con- 

 ception of induction, that Bacon merited the 

 title so generally awarded to him of Founder of 

 the Inductive Philosophy. 2 It is curious, then, 

 that Mill in the later chapter finds it necessary to 

 make this loose, uncertain, and insufficient meth- 

 od the basis of his system, inasmuch as it is rep- 

 resented to be our means of learning the univer- 

 sality of the law of causation, on which the va- 

 lidity of the rigid inductive processes depends. 

 Now, in a foot-note to chapter iii., we are referred 

 to chapters xxi. and xxii. ; and in chapter xxi. we 

 are similarly referred back to chapter iii. Never- 

 theless, as I have said, the doctrine of the early 

 chapter fails to square with that of the later one. 

 But there is so much else to come, that I need 

 not dwell upon this discrepancy. 



The next reflection that suggests itself is the 

 apparent incongruity of basing the whole of our 

 inductive knowledge of Nature upon a loose, and 

 uncertain, and insufficient kind of induction. In 

 several places Mill speaks of this kind of induc- 

 tion with unmitigated scorn. He says : 3 



" The Induction of the ancients has been well 

 described by Bacon, under the name of ' lnductio 



1 Chapter iii., beginning of fifth paragraph . 



2 Same section, fifth paragraph. 



3 Chapter iii., section 2, third paragraph. 



per enumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur 

 instantia contradictoria.' It consists in ascribing 

 the character of general truths to all propositions 

 which are true in every instance that we happen 

 to know of. This is the kind of induction x which 

 is natural to the mind when unaccustomed to 

 scientific methods. The tendency, which some 

 call an instinct, and which others account for by 

 association, to infer the future from the past, the 

 known from the unknown, is simply a habit of 

 expecting that what has been found true once or 

 several times, and never yet found false, will be 

 found true again. . . . 



"Popular notions are usually founded on in- 

 duction by simple enumeration ; in science it car- 

 ries us but a little way. We are forced to begin 

 with it; we must often rely on it provisionally, 

 in the absence of means of more searching inves- 

 tigation. But, for the accurate study of Nature, 

 we require a surer and more potent instrument." 



He proceeds, in the next paragraph, still more 

 strongly to denounce this loose method of induc- 

 tion. Speaking of moral and political inquiries, 

 be says : 



" The current and approved modes of reason- 

 ing on these subjects are still of the same vicious 

 description against which Bacon protested ; the 

 method almost exclusively employed by those pro- 

 fessing to treat such matters inductively, is the very 

 inductio per enumerationem simplicem which he 

 condemns ; and the experience which we hear so 

 confidently appealed to by all sects, parties, and 

 interests, is still, in his own emphatic words, mera 

 palpatio." 



An obvious difficulty presents itself; if rigid 

 induction depends upon the experimental meth- 

 ods ; if these depend upon the law of causation, and 

 this law depends upon inductio per enumeratio- 

 nem simplicem ; then the validity of all our induc- 

 tions depends on a loose and uncertain foundation. 

 The upper parts of the logical edifice cannot be 

 firmer than its base. Mill, when he comes to 

 the point, shows a creditable consciousness of this 

 difficulty, and accordingly discovers for the oc- 

 casion that this loose method of induction is not 

 always loose. In the third chapter 2 he remarks : 



1 In the first and second editions we here find the 

 significant words " if it deserves the name," that is, of 

 induction ; 'thus wc find the great empirical philoso- 

 pher, whose work it was to show the inductive basis 

 of all mathematical and other science, accidentally 

 questioning the propriety of allowing the name "in- 

 duction" to that process upon which he ultimately 

 bases our knowledge of the universal law of causation, 

 as well as the axioms of geometry. When he inserted 

 these unlucky words he must have forgotten that it 

 was the basis of his system, or ebe he had not yet 

 discovered the fact. 



2 Section 2, fourth paragraph. 



