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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.— SUPPLEMENT. 



to the basis of his empirical philosophy, except 

 in the section or two written when he happened 

 to remember that it was the basis. Then, again, 

 where are the rules of this method of induction ? 

 If it be usually so insufficient and fallible a sup- 

 port, surely it was all the more requisite that we 

 should have precise rules whereby to judge when 

 it is precarious and when it is not. But the rules 

 and canons given in the treatise are those of the 

 four Experimental Methods, and these rules can- 

 not possibly help us, because the methods them- 

 selves derive their validity from the underlying 

 law of causation, which is established by inductio 

 per enumerationem simplicem. I say, then, that 

 just where Mill's analysis should have been most 

 careful, and his canons most explicit, there is 

 nothing of the sort, and, if we seek for a descrip- 

 tion of this fundamental kind of inductive rea- 

 soning, we find it called by a Latin phrase, and 

 treated with impatience and contempt. 



But let us make the best of such descriptions 

 of the fundamental process of his " system " as 

 Mill favors us with. I have already quoted one 

 passage in which he says that the kind of induc- 

 tion in question " consists in ascribing the char- 

 acter of general truths to all propositions which 

 are true in every instance that we happen to 

 know of." 



Elsewhere ' Mill, in reference to coexistences 

 independent of causation, says : 



" In the absence, then, of any universal law of 

 coexistence, similar to the universal law of cau- 

 sation which regulates sequence, we are thrown 

 back upon the unscientific induction of the an- 

 cients, per enumerationem simplicem, ubi non re- 

 peritur instantia contradictoria. The reason we 

 have for believing that all crows are black is sim- 

 ply, that we have seen and heard of many black 

 crows, and never one of any other color. It re- 

 mains to be considered hnw far this evidence can 

 reach, and how we are to measure its strength in 

 any given case." 



It is true that in the sections which follow we 

 have some vague discussions as to the circum- 

 stances under which we may trust an empirical 

 induction. But in writing these sections Mill 

 seems again to have forgotten that the law of 

 causation is founded on the same basis. In the 

 passage quoted above we are told that, in the ab- 

 sence of a universal law similar to the universal 

 law of causation, we are thrown back upon the 

 unscientific induction of the ancients. But sure- 

 ly in the case of causation also we are similarly 

 thrown back on this unscientific induction, if wc 

 wish to know the ultimate warrant for our infer- 

 1 Chapter xxii., section 4, last paragraph. 



ences. In these sections Mill professes to treat 

 only "Of Coexistences independent of Causa- 

 tion," such being the title and subject of the 

 whole chapter. He gives no indication how we 

 are to apply the same process to prove the law 

 of causation itself, which is always by him sharp- 

 ly distinguished from the cases treated in the 

 chapter named. In fact, he tells us, in the first 

 paragraph of the fourth section, that the appli- 

 cation of a system of rigorous scientific induction 

 is precluded in the cases here treated. " The 

 basis of such a system is wanting : there is no 

 general axiom standing in the same relation to 

 the uniformities of coexistence as the law of cau- 

 sation does to those of succession." In fact, Mill 

 writes throughout this chapter as if the law of 

 causation had nothing to do with induction by 

 simple enumeration, upon which we are thrown 

 back in other cases. 



Turning again to the most distinct account 

 which we get of this method, we find that induc- 

 tion by simple enumeration consists in ascribing 

 the character of general truths to all propositions 

 which are true in every instance that we happen 

 to know of. Now, the universal law of causation 

 is to the effect that every phenomenon is invari- 

 ably sequent upon some other phenomenon called 

 the cause. It is the law of invariable and (as he 

 sometimes insists) unconditional sequence. If we 

 learn the truth of this law by simple enumera- 

 tion, we must ascribe the character of a general 

 truth to it, because we know it to be true in 

 every instance that we happen to know of. That 

 is to say, in the case of every particular phenom- 

 enon which has occurred to us, we must have 

 assured ourselves that there was a cause upon 

 which it was invariably sequent, before we could 

 have the materials for an induction by simple 

 enumeration. The inductive process here, as far 

 as we can gather, consists only in inferring of all 

 cases what we know to be true without exception 

 of those which have attracted our attention. But 

 at this point difficulties crowd upon us. Mill can 

 never have formed any clear idea in his mind of 

 the way in which this simple enumeration helps 

 us to the law of causation. The first question to 

 which he supplies no answer is, how in any par- 

 ticular case we know that a phenomenon has a 

 cause, we being supposed ignorant of the univer- 

 sal law of causation ? When leading up to his 

 great experimental methods, Mill excites our in- 

 terest by showing the extreme difficulty of dis- 

 covering the relation of cause and effect. He 

 says : ' 



1 Chapter vii., second paragraph. 



