JOHN STUART MILL'S PHILOSOPHY TESTED. 



91 



" The order of Nature, as perceived at a first 

 glance, presents at every instant a chaos followed 

 by another chaos. We must decompose each chaos 

 into single facts. We must learn to see in the cha- 

 otic antecedent a multitude of distinct antecedents, 

 in the chaotic consequent a multitude of distinct 

 consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of 

 itself tell us on which of the antecedents each con- 

 sequent is invariably attendant. To determine 

 that point, we must endeavor to effect a separation 

 of the facts from one another, not in our minds 

 only, but in Nature." 



Continuing at the commencement of the next 

 section, we read : 



"The different antecedents and consequents, 

 being, then, supposed to be, so far as the case re- 

 quires, ascertained and discriminated from one an- 

 other, we are to inquire which is connected with 

 which. In every instance which comes under our 

 observation, there are many antecedents and many 

 consequents. If those antecedents could not be 

 severed from one another except in thought, or if 

 those consequents never were found apart, it would 

 be impossible for us to distinguish (a posteriori 

 at least) the real laws, or to assign to .any cause its 

 effect, or to any effect its cause." 



He goes on to explain that, to effect this analy- 

 sis, we must be able to meet with some of the 

 antecedents apart from the rest, and observe what 

 follows from them. We must follow the Baconian 

 rule of varying the circumstances, and it is this 

 rule which is developed into the four Experimen- 

 tal Methods. But here we are in a most palpable 

 difficulty. We cannot assign any sequent to a 

 particular antecedent without going through the 

 elaborate investigations referred to above — with- 

 out, in fact, employing the experimental methods, 

 explicitly or implicitly. Even the first of those 

 methods — that of Agreement — is insufficient for 

 the purpose, because we are told l that it has the 

 defect of not proving causation, and can, there- 

 fore, only be employed for the ascertainment of 

 empirical laws. Now we are in a perfect vicious 

 circle. Causation is proved only by the Method 

 of Difference. That method derives its validity 

 from the universality of the law of causation. 

 The universality of this law is ascertained by in- 

 duction bysimple enumeration, which requires that 

 we shall have ascertained the truth of the law in 

 every particular case, a thing which clearly could 

 not be done without the Method of Difference. 

 The whole edifice of Mill's inductive logic, elabo- 

 rately described in the twenty-five long chapters 

 of the third book, collapses. The basis disappears 

 altogether, and the four pillars, the four Experi- 



1 Chapter xvii., second paragraph. 



mental Methods, are left supporting themselves 

 in a logical void. 



If another stroke were needed for the over- 

 throw of Mill's vaunted system, it could easily be 

 given in the form of one question : Are there 

 really no apparent exceptions to the universal 

 law of causation ? Mill grounds this law upon 

 induction by simple enumeration, ubi non repe- 

 ritur inslantia contradictoria, " when no contra- 

 dictory instance is encountered." Applied to the 

 case of causation, this process would require that 

 in all our experience we had never noticed, or 

 at least investigated, a case without ascertaining 

 that the law of causation was verified. What a 

 monstrous assumption is this ! Will any one deny 

 that there are whole regions of facts familiarly 

 known to us where we cannot detect the action 

 of causation ? What determines the sex of young 

 animals ? What produces unexpected forms, and 

 diseases, monstrous births, lusus naturce, as they 

 are significantly called ? All kinds of tumors, 

 ulcers, and local diseases, spring up in various 

 parts of the human body, and medical science 

 can usually give no explanation of them. It is 

 astonishing how statements made in a work of re- 

 pute are allowed to pass unquestioned, although 

 directly contrary to the most obvious facts. Of 

 course, we may expect or believe that all such 

 phenomena will sooner or later be explained as 

 the effects of undiscovered causes, but such ex- 

 pectation must be a priori in its origin, if Mill's 

 own account of the way in which we ascertain 

 the law of causation empirically is true. It is 

 useless to say that we can prove the law of causa- 

 tion empirically, when apparent exceptions to its 

 truth are endless in number. A certain probabil- 

 ity no doubt may be given to the law empirically, 

 but this does not help Mill, who frequently states 

 that the law of causation is certainly and univer- 

 sally true, and that, as soon as the principle of 

 causation makes its appearance, the precarious 

 inferences derived from simple enumeration are 

 superseded and disappear from the field. 1 



No doubt a skillful controversialist might find 

 in Mill's book many openings for a plausible re- 

 ply, but none of them would bear cross-examina- 

 tion. It might be pointed out that Mill, in the 

 twenty-first chapter, shows his consciousness of 

 the precarious nature of induction by simple enu- 

 meration, but urges that, by widening the sphere 

 of induction, we may indefinitely increase the cer- 

 tainty of the inference. This argument, however, 

 would show complete misapprehension of the 

 theory of probability, and the principles of evi- 



1 Chapter xviii., section 4, end of third paragraph. 



