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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY —SUPPLEMENT. 



number that gives to these events their time- 

 measuring property, or are there likewise other 

 qualities in these events which may give them as 

 time-measurerc a differential value 9 Now, if num- 

 ber is the only quality whereby successive events 

 determine our appreciation of the passage of 

 „ime. it is evident tha<; there is no need for fur- 

 ther analysis in the psychology of time-conscious- 

 ness, for in this case time-consciousness would 

 merely be a mental abstraction of the number of 

 events which by their sequence generated our 

 time-consciousness of the interval during which 

 they were taking place. But, on the other hand, 

 if number is not the only quality whereby succes- 

 sive events determine our appreciation of time, it 

 is evident that an interesting question for psycho- 

 logical analysis is opened up ; for in this case it re- 

 mains to ascertain the other quality or qualities in 

 successive events to which their differential value 

 as time-measurers is due. Let us, then, in the 

 first place, interrogate consciousness with the view 

 of ascertaining whether it is number alone that 

 gives to successive events their property of gener- 

 ating in consciousness our appreciation of time. 



Almost as soon as this question is carefully 

 put, consciousness replies that the mere number 

 of successive events is certainly not the only fac- 

 tor in determining their influence on our estimate 

 of the time during which they were taking place. 

 We have but to reflect on the extraordinary dis- 

 crepancies in our estimate of time when we com- 

 pare such experiences as the following : Suppose 

 we have to row or to run a race concerning the 

 result of which we are anxious, how great a con- 

 trast there is between the apparent duration of 

 the five minutes before the start — which seem 

 like an hour — and the five minutes during which 

 we are actively engaged in the race ! The same 

 incredible discrepancy in our estimate of time is 

 observable shortly before and shortly after the 

 commencement of a competitive examination, or 

 even of a public lecture. Again, how different is 

 our estimate of time when we take a solitary 

 "constitutional" walk, and when we return over 

 the same ground with an intellectual companion ! 

 And, to give only one other instance, how inter- 

 minable the time seems while we are waiting an 

 hour or two at a country railway-station, as com- 

 pared with a similar interval after we have met a 

 friend in the train and are passing through novel 

 and beautiful scenery ! Now in all these cases — 

 and scores of others might be added — it is the 

 interval during which there is a comparative ab- 

 sence of events that appears so protracted, while 

 the similar interval which immediately succeeds 



it, and which by comparison appears so brief, fs an 

 interval which is crowded with striking events, 

 or a succession of vivid states of conscious- 

 ness Thus I think there can be no question 

 that it is not number alone that gives to succes- 

 sive events in consciousness their character of 

 time-measurers. But, before proceeding to a 

 further analysis, it is desirable to be a little more 

 explicit about the term " successive events." All 

 that can be properly denoted by this term as 

 above used is successive states of consciousness, 

 and it is in this sense that I shall use the term 

 throughout. This being understood, it may be 

 objected to the above illustrations that, as con- 

 sciousness can only exist in virtue of a perpetual 

 change of states, it is really inaccurate to speak 

 of a greater number of such changes taking place 

 in any given interval of time than in any other 

 interval of equal duration. Into this question, 

 however, it is not necessary to go, because, even 

 if the point were conceded that in equal intervals 

 of time consciousness undergoes equal numbers 

 of changes, it would only tend to emphasize my 

 statement, viz., that, as equal intervals of time 

 may appear to be of very different durations, the 

 mere number of the changes of our states of con- 

 sciousness during the intervals compared cannot 

 be the only factor in determining our apprecia- 

 tion of their respective lengths. This latter posi- 

 tion, then, being now established, the problem 

 which we have to solve is merely this : What 

 other qualities besides that of the number of their 

 changes give to states of consciousness their value 

 as time-measurers ? From the examples above 

 cited, there would at first sight appear to emerge 

 the very paradoxical inference that the more 

 vivid the states of consciousness, and the more 

 abrupt their changes, the less is their value as 

 time-measurers. This would be a very paradoxi- 

 cal inference, because, if the consciousness of 

 time is determined by the number of changes in 

 our states of consciousness, a priori we should 

 expect that the more decided these changes are, 

 and the consequently deeper impression which in 

 memory they leave of their occurrence, the great- 

 er would be their value as time-measurers. But 

 there is, I think, a road of escape from this para- 

 doxical inference ; and, as in all such cases, this 

 road consists in the recognition of an additional 

 cause. Before stating this additional cause, how- 

 ever, I should like to show that, if examples are 

 chosen in which its disturbing influence is absent, 

 the a priori expectation above mentioned is found 

 to be realized. Thus, for instance, it is a familiar 

 observation that in childhood the years seem of 



