FEELING AND ENERGY. 



467 



fore, that he does not mean to exclude energy 

 from his definition of the object-world. 



The late Mr. Spalding, also a representative 

 of the same school, evidently included energy 

 along with matter under the term " physical," as 

 opposed to the mental, " the unextended." " The 

 physical and mental," he said, " stand over 

 against each other, a fundamental duality of being 

 which no effort of thought has been able to tran- 

 scend." 



Now, if feeling be unextended in the exactly 

 opposite sense that energy has extension (name- 

 ly, of extension in time), feeling will certainly 

 never merge into or alternate with energy, for 

 energy has extension in time. But if it be true 

 that energy has time-extension, it is equally true 

 that feeling has time-extension. By energy hav- 

 ing extension in time, we mean that it endures in 

 its action for a longer or shorter period. We 

 must apply the same quality to feeling, it is evi- 

 dent, for feeling endures also in the same sense 

 as energy. If by applying the term " extension " 

 to energy is meant merely the mental association 

 with our idea of energy of an idea of time-exten- 

 sion, and not that energy actually endures, the 

 same subtile distinction must be applied to feel- 

 ing, namely, that feeling as extended in time 

 should not be spoken of as a reality, but merely 

 our mental association with the conception in our 

 minds of feeling of an idea of extension is all 

 that we mean when we describe a feeling as ex- 

 tended in time. In this very subtile but hazy 

 language there will be found, after all, no real 

 contrast between feeling and energy, for both 

 must be regarded as having extension in time in 

 exactly the same sense. K we admit, as we must, 

 that feeling has extension in time, there appears 

 to be no necessity for any longer regarding it 

 as something totally unlike anything else in Na- 

 ture. 



Further, if we institute a comparison between 

 feeling and energy, I think we shall find that they 

 are wonderfully alike. We cannot speak of the 

 length, breadth, or volume, of energy or of feel- 

 ing, and therefore neither can be said to be pos- 

 sessed of space-extension. But we say of energy 

 or feeling equally, " It is here, it is there," in an 

 extended body ; and therefore, though these af- 

 fections of matter have no space-extension in 

 themselves, they are both related to that which 

 has space-extension (as well as time-extension), 

 namely, matter. But their likeness is still more 

 confirmed when we remark that they possess in 

 common other characteristics which we do not 

 observe in the mere substance-matter. We 



speak of energy or feeling as being " intense or 

 violent, weak or dull," both being qualified as 

 manifesting degrees or quantity. 



Can these strong features of resemblance be- 

 tween feeling and energy justify the ascription of 

 uniqueness to feeling or its opposability to all 

 that is termed physical ? So long as the term 

 physical includes energy, it is evident that no 

 such contrast can be legitimately drawn. If the 

 term " physical " merely comprehended the sub- 

 stance-matter, it would be legitimate to contrast 

 feeling with matter in the same way that a prop- 

 erty is distinguished from that in which the 

 property inheres. But energy, being an affection 

 of matter also, could in the same way be distin- 

 guished from the substance wherein it was mani- 

 fested. There is, indeed, no sense I am aware of 

 in which feeling can be contrasted with matter 

 that is not equally applicable to energy. 



But, if feeling and energy are after all so very 

 similar that we apply almost invariably the same 

 language to each, I am at a loss to see wherein 

 they should be considered so dissimilar as that 

 the hypothesis of alternation I have advanced 

 should be deemed untenable. The language of 

 experience describes these two affections as differ- 

 ing only in the sense of receiving and giving. 

 We say : " I feel, I act ; I receive an influence, I 

 give forth an influence ; I am passive, I am ac- 

 tive." When we use such language we are de- 

 scribing two states of the same being, subjecting 

 these states to the only contrasts of which they 

 are capable. My experience tells me of no other 

 difference between feeling and energy than that 

 the former is the aroused, awakened, affected, 

 the latter the arousing, awakening, affecting, 

 phase of my being. 



Having met the objection of the alleged total 

 dissimilarity between the mental state, feeling, 

 and the physical state, energy, and endeavored, 

 as far as my language and logic can, to repel the 

 allegation, I must now deal with the next objec- 

 tion likely to be urged against the hypothesis of 

 alternation. 



It is objected that, even admitting the simi- 

 larity between feeling and energy to be sufficient 

 to satisfy a theory of alternation, there is yet want- 

 ed a locus in time wherein the supposed alterna- 

 tion may transpire. The " physical processes 

 concerned in nervous action," say the objectors, 

 " are complete in themselves without the inter- 

 vention of mental states." The dynamical activ- 

 ity of an excited nerve is believed to be perfect- 

 ly unbroken from first to last. No interval of 

 time, however brief, is regarded as possible dur- 



