THE COURSE OF NATURE. 



491 



Let us now turn once more to the theory of 

 scrutable design, which supposes at least the oc- 

 casional action of causes which the human intel- 

 lect can perceive to have been intended to pro- 

 duce certain effects — such as the salvation of the 

 righteous, the punishment of the wicked, the 

 warning of the indifferent, or the preservation of 

 the race. Studying this theory from the purely 

 scientific standpoint in all the varying forms in 

 which history presents it, we see its distinguish- 

 ing feature to be the idea of causes acting so as 

 to bring about certain results. 



When Pallas inspired Diomedes with renewed 

 strength and gave superhuman accuracy to his 

 aim, it was in order that he might be able to 

 pierce his Trojan enemies. Ordinary investiga- 

 tion might fail to show that his haDd trembled 

 less than usual as he raised his javelin; but the 

 goddess took care that the last quiver, as the 

 weapon left his hand, should be in the direction 

 to send it into the breast of the foe. The utter- 

 ances of the oracles were determined not by the 

 past or the present, but by events still in the 

 future. The blazing comet appeared not in obe- 

 dience to a chain of causes commencing with the 

 creation, but in order that man might be warned 

 of the coming calamity. When the prayers of 

 the righteous averted the coming storm, the cloud 

 moved aside in order that their fields and houses 

 might be saved ; and when they brought down 

 the gentle rain upon the parched fields, the rain 

 fell in order that famine might be averted. 



These supposed causes differed from what 

 enlightened minds now understand by the term 

 Providence, in being amenable to scientific inves- 

 tigation, and in not being included in the regular 

 chain of natural phenomena. The designs of 

 Providence are inscrutable ; but those of Pallas 

 and Juno were not. Careful experimental inves- 

 tigation, such as might have been undertaken by 

 a Helmholtz of that time, would have sufficed to 

 show just how Pallas wanted the spear thrown, 

 if the view of the Homeric age was the correct 

 one. When the king died or the enemy was vic- 

 torious, men thought they knew exactly why the 

 comet appeared when it did. 



These views having so far vanished into thin 

 air, I do not see how we can avoid recognizing 

 the reality of the revolution which modern science 

 claims to have made in the views of men respect- 

 ing the course of Nature. And yet, as I have 

 already shown, there are many tendencies in our 

 being which make us unwilling to admit the rev- 

 olution, and lead many to look upon the old the- 

 ory as correct, provided it were only considered 



as tracing causes to the will of the Creator. On 

 what is this view founded at the present time? 

 Entirely, it seems to me, in ignoring the distinc- 

 tion between the scrutable and the iuscrutable ; 

 between the seen and the unseen worlds. Science 

 has to a greater or less degree banished final 

 causes from the visible universe ; but they act 

 with undiminished vigor in the invisible one. 

 Such a translation may not be a great revolution 

 in thought from a theological point of view ; but 

 it certainly is from a scientific standpoint, which 

 considers only visible things. 



I can readily imagine your asking if teleologi- 

 cal causes can be readily considered as absolute- 

 ly banished from the whole domain of visible 

 Nature ; if, considering how limited our knowl- 

 edge, and how vast that part even of the visible 

 universe which we do not know, it is not rash to 

 assert that we know the true theory of Nature, 

 even in the field of phenomena. This question 

 may lead us to look a little more carefully than 

 we have hitherto done upon the exact standing 

 of the doctrine of the uniform course of Nature 

 according to antecedent causes, and the relation 

 of this doctrine to modern scientific investigation. 

 And this leads me to say that it would be entirely 

 unphilcsophical to regard the revolution I have 

 described as a scientific discovery or induction. 

 It may be doubted whether the scientific mind is 

 really any less disposed to believe in final causes 

 than the ordinary mind. Nor can the theory 

 that the course of Nature is symbolized by the 

 chain of cause and effect, as I have described it, 

 be considered as product of modern investigation 

 simply, or as belonging especially to the present 

 age. It is a theory w r hich has been, in a limited 

 sphere, recognized by all men at all times. The 

 reason why modern science has so greatly extend- 

 ed its scope is that modern science has acquired 

 a vastly more extended view of Nature than 

 has before been obtained. We know full well 

 that the action of teleological causes has always 

 been ascribed to operations into which human 

 investigation could not penetrate, although their 

 ultimate effects might be plainly seen. When- 

 ever the subject becomes so well understood 

 that the chain of natural causes can be clearly 

 followed, miracles and final causes cease, so far 

 as the scientific explanation of things is con- 

 cerned. That a ball or sphere thrown in one di- 

 rection would bend its course into an entirely 

 different direction no one ever supposed. Homer 

 never imagined Pallas as changing the course of 

 the javelin after it had left the hand of Diomedes. 

 But those states of the nervous system which 



