66 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



present problem, the common knowledge involved is of 

 various kinds. There is first our acquaintance with 

 particular objects of daily life furniture, houses, towns, 

 other people, and so on. Then there is the extension 

 of such particular knowledge to particular things outside 

 our personal experience, through history and geography, 

 newspapers, etc. And lastly, there is the systematisation 

 of all this knowledge of particulars by means of physical 

 science, which derives immense persuasive force from 

 its astonishing power of foretelling the future. We are 

 quite willing to admit that there may be errors of detail 

 in this knowledge, but we believe them to be discoverable 

 and corrigible by the methods which have given rise to 

 our beliefs, and we do not, as practical men, entertain 

 for a moment the hypothesis that the whole edifice may 

 be built on insecure foundations. In the main, therefore, 

 and without absolute dogmatism as to this or that special 

 portion, we may accept this mass of common knowledge 

 as affording data for our philosophical analysis. 



It may be said and this is an objection which must 

 be met at the outset that it is the duty of the philosopher 

 to call in question the admittedly fallible beliefs of daily 

 life, and to replace them by something more solid and 

 irrefragable. In a sense this is true, and in a sense it is 

 effected in the course of analysis. But in another sense, 

 and a very important one, it is quite impossible. While 

 admitting that doubt is possible with regard to all our 

 common knowledge, we must nevertheless accept that 

 knowledge in the main if philosophy is to be possible at 

 all. There is not any superfine brand of knowledge, 

 obtainable by the philosopher, which can give us a stand- 

 point from which to criticise the whole of the knowledge 

 of daily life. The most that can be done is to examine 

 and purify our common knowledge by an internal scrutiny, 



