THE EXTERNAL WORLD 69 



would be necessary in our own country. Thus the first 

 step in the analysis of data, namely, the discovery of what 

 is really given in sense, is full of difficulty. We will, 

 however, not linger on this point ; so long as its existence 

 is realised, the exact outcome does not make any very 

 great difference in our main problem. 



The next step in our analysis must be the consideration 

 of how the derivative parts of our common knowledge 

 arise. Here we become involved in a somewhat puzzling 

 entanglement of logic and psychology. Psychologically, 

 a belief may be called derivative whenever it is caused 

 by one or more other beliefs, or by some fact of sense 

 which is not simply what the belief asserts. Derivative 

 beliefs in this sense constantly arise without any process 

 of logical inference, merely by association of ideas or 

 some equally extra-logical process. From the expression 

 of a man's face we judge as to what he is feeling : we 

 say we see that he is angry, when in fact we only see a 

 frown. We do not judge as to his state of mind by any 

 logical process : the judgment grows up, often without 

 our being able to say what physical mark of emotion we 

 actually saw. In such a case, the knowledge is derivative 

 psychologically ; but logically it is in a sense primitive, 

 since it is not the result of any logical deduction. There 

 may or may not be a possible deduction leading to the 

 same result, but whether there is or not, we certainly do 

 not employ it. If we call a belief " logically primitive ' 

 when it is not actually arrived at by a logical inference, 

 then innumerable beliefs are logically primitive which 

 psychologically are derivative. The separation of these 

 two kinds of primitiveness is vitally important to our 

 present discussion. 



When we reflect upon the beliefs which are logically 

 but not psychologically primitive, we find that, unless 



