THE EXTERNAL WORLD 71 



logic. The more we reflect upon these, the more we 

 realise exactly what they are, and exactly what a doubt 

 concerning them really means, the more luminously 

 certain do they become. Verbal doubt concerning even 

 these is possible, but verbal doubt may occur when what 

 is nominally being doubted is not really in our thoughts, 

 and only words are actually present to our minds. Real 

 doubt, in these two cases, would, I think, be pathological. 

 At any rate, to me they seem quite certain, and I shall 

 assume that you agree with me in this. Without this 

 assumption, we are in danger of falling into that universal 

 scepticism which, as we saw, is as barren as it is irrefutable. 

 If we are to continue philosophising, we must make our 

 bow to the sceptical hypothesis, and, while admitting the 

 elegant terseness of its philosophy, proceed to the con- 

 sideration of other hypotheses which, though perhaps not 

 certain, have at least as good a right to our respect as the 

 hypothesis of the sceptic. 



Applying our distinction of " hard " and " soft " data 

 to psychologically derivative but logically primitive beliefs, 

 we shall find that most, if not all, are to be classed as soft 

 data. They may be found, on reflection, to be capable 

 of logical proof, and they then again become believed, 

 but no longer as data. As data, though entitled to a 

 certain limited respect, they cannot be placed on a level 

 with the facts of sense or the laws of logic. The kind of 

 respect which they deserve seems to me such as to warrant 

 us in hoping, though not too confidently, that the hard 

 data may prove them to be at least probable. Also, if 

 the hard data are found to throw no light whatever upon 

 their truth or falsehood, we are justified, I think, in 

 giving rather more weight to the hypothesis of their 

 truth than to the hypothesis of their falsehood. For the 

 present, however, let us confine ourselves to the hard 



