76 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



Now it is necessary here first of all to distinguish between 

 (i) our sensation, which is a mental event consisting in 

 our being aware of a sensible object, and (2) the sensible 

 object of which we are aware in sensation. When I 

 speak of the sensible object, it must be understood that 

 I do not mean such a thing as a table, which is both 

 visible and tangible, can be seen by many people at once, 

 and is more or less permanent. What I mean is just 

 that patch of colour which is momentarily seen when we 

 look at the table, or just that particular hardness which 

 is felt when we press it, or just that particular sound 

 which is heard when we rap it. Each of these I call a 

 sensible object, and our awareness of it I call a sensation. 

 Now our sense of passivity, if it really afforded any 

 argument, would only tend to show that the sensation 

 has an outside cause ; this cause we should naturally 

 seek in the sensible object. Thus there is no good 

 reason, so far, for supposing that sensible objects must 

 have outside causes. But both the thing-in-itself of 

 philosophy and the matter of physics present themselves 

 as outside causes of the sensible object as much as of the 

 sensation. What are the grounds for this common 

 opinion ? 



In each case, I think, the opinion has resulted from the 

 combination of a belief that something which can persist 

 independently of our consciousness makes itself known 

 in sensation, with the fact that our sensations often change 

 in ways which seem to depend upon us rather than upon 

 anything which would be supposed to persist independ- 

 ently of us. At first, we believe unreflectingly that 

 everything is as it seems to be, and that, if we shut our 

 eyes, the objects we had been seeing remain as they were 

 though we no longer see them. But there are arguments 

 against this view, which have generally been thought 



