8 6 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



in themselves, they are every bit as real as the objects 

 of waking life. And conversely, the sensible objects of 

 waking life must not be expected to have any more 

 intrinsic reality than those of dreams. Dreams and 

 waking life, in our first efforts at construction, must be 

 treated with equal respect ; it is only by some reality not 

 merely sensible that dreams can be condemned. 



Accepting the indubitable momentary reality of objects 

 of sense, the next thing to notice is the confusion under- 

 lying objections derived from their changeableness. As 

 we walk round the table, its aspect changes ; but it is 

 thought impossible to maintain either that the table 

 changes, or that its various aspects can all " really' ' exist 

 in the same place. If we press one eyeball, we shall see 

 two tables ; but it is thought preposterous to maintain 

 that there are "really" two tables. Such arguments, 

 however, seem to involve the assumption that there can 

 be something more real than objects of sense. If we 

 see two tables, then there are two visual tables. It is 

 perfectly true that, at the same moment, we may discover 

 by touch that there is only one tactile table. This makes 

 us declare the two visual tables an illusion, because 

 usually one visual object corresponds to one tactile object. 

 But all that we are warranted in saying is that, in this 

 case, the manner of correlation of touch and sight is 

 unusual. Again, when the aspect of the table changes as 

 we walk round it, and we are told there cannot be so 

 many different aspects in the same place, the answer is 

 simple : what does the critic of the table mean by " the 

 same place " ? The use of such a phrase presupposes that 

 all our difficulties have been solved ; as yet, we have no 

 right to speak of a " place ' except with reference to one 

 given set of momentary sense-data. When all are 

 changed by a bodily movement, no place remains the 



