34 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



tradition, and in one way or other have widened the 

 scope of logic. 



The first extension was the introduction of the 

 inductive method by Bacon and Galileo by the former 

 in a theoretical and largely mistaken form, by the latter 

 in actual use in establishing the foundations of modern 

 physics and astronomy. This is probably the only 

 extension of the old logic which has become familiar 

 to the general educated public. But induction, important 

 as it is when regarded as a method of investigation, does 

 not seem to remain when its work is done : in the final 

 form of a perfected science, it would seem that everything 

 ought to be deductive. If induction remains at all, 

 which is a difficult question, it will remain merely as one 

 of the principles according to which deductions are 

 effected. Thus the ultimate result of the introduction 

 of the inductive method seems not the creation of a new 

 kind of non-deductive reasoning, but rather the widening 

 of the scope of deduction by pointing out a way of 

 deducing which is certainly not syllogistic, and does not 

 fit into the mediaeval scheme. 



The question of the scope and validity of induction 

 is of great difficulty, and of great importance to our 

 knowledge. Take such a question as, " Will the sun rise 

 to-morrow ? " Our first instinctive feeling is that we 

 have abundant reason for saying that it will, because it 

 has risen on so many previous mornings. Now, I do not 

 myself know whether this does afford a ground or not, 

 but I am willing to suppose that it does. The question 

 which then arises is : What is the principle of inference 

 by which we pass from past sunrises to future ones ? 

 The answer given by Mill is that the inference depends 

 upon the law of causation. Let us suppose this to be 

 true ; then what is the reason for believing in the law of 



