38 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



fallacious, but which requires discussion if only to show 

 how their conception of logic differs from the conception 

 which 1 wish to advocate. In their writings, logic is 

 practically identical with metaphysics. In broad outline, 

 the way this came about is as follows. Hegel believed 

 that, by means of a priori reasoning, it could be shown 

 that the world must have various important and interesting 

 characteristics, since any world without these character- 

 istics would be impossible and self-contradictory. Thus 

 what he calls " logic " is an investigation of the nature of 

 the universe, in so far as this can be inferred merely 

 from the principle that the universe must be logically 

 self-consistent. I do not myself believe that from this 

 principle alone anything of importance can be inferred as 

 regards the existing universe. But, however that may 

 be, I should not regard Hegel's reasoning, even if it 

 were valid, as properly belonging to logic : it would 

 rather be an application of logic to the actual world. 

 Logic itself would be concerned rather with such 

 questions as what self-consistency is, which Hegel, so far 

 as I know, does not discuss. And though he criticises 

 the traditional logic, and professes to replace it by an 

 improved logic of his own, there is some sense in which 

 the traditional logic, with all its faults, is uncritically and 

 unconsciously assumed throughout his reasoning. It is 

 not in the direction advocated by him, it seems to me, 

 that the reform of logic is to be sought, but by a more 

 fundamental, more patient, and less ambitious investiga- 

 tion into the presuppositions which his system shares 

 with those of most other philosophers. 



The way in which, as it seems to me, Hegel's system 

 assumes the ordinary logic which it subsequently criticises, 

 is exemplified by the general conception of " categories " 

 with which he operates throughout. This conception is, 



