4 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



it represents the attempt to adapt to present needs the 

 methods and results of the great constructive philosophers 

 from Plato downwards. The second type, which may 

 be called evolutionism, derived its predominance from 

 Darwin, and must be reckoned as having had Herbert 

 Spencer for its first philosophical representative ; but in 

 recent times it has become, chiefly through William 

 James and M. Bergson, far bolder and far more searching 

 in its innovations than it was in the hands of Herbert 

 Spencer. The third type, which may be called " logical 

 atomism " for want of a better name, has gradually crept 

 into philosophy through the critical scrutiny of mathe- 

 matics. This type of philosophy, which is the one that 

 I wish to advocate, has not as yet many whole-hearted 

 adherents, but the " new realism " which owes its inception 

 to Harvard is very largely impregnated with its spirit. 

 It represents, I believe, the same kind of advance as was 

 introduced into physics by Galileo : the substitution of 

 piecemeal, detailed, and verifiable results for large untested 

 generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to 

 imagination. But before we can understand the changes 

 advocated by this new philosophy, we must briefly 

 examine and criticise the other two types with which it 

 has to contend. 



A. The Classical Tradition 



Twenty years ago, the classical tradition, having van- 

 quished the opposing tradition of the English empiricists, 

 held almost unquestioned sway in all Anglo-Saxon 

 universities. At the present day, though it is losing 

 ground, many of the most prominent teachers still adhere 

 to it. In academic France, in spite of M. Bergson, it is 

 far stronger than all its opponents combined ; and in 

 Germany it has many vigorous advocates. Nevertheless, 



