THE THEORY OF CONTINUITY 151 



in one relation as in another. Hence, if this doctrine is 

 true, there can never be more than one fact concerning 

 any one thing. I do not think the philosophers in 

 question have realised that this is the precise statement 

 of the view they advocate, because in this form the view 

 is so contrary to plain truth that its falsehood is evident 

 as soon as it is stated. The discussion of this question, 

 however, involves so many logical subtleties, and is so 

 beset with difficulties, that I shall not pursue it further 

 at present. 



When once the above general doctrine is rejected, it 

 is obvious that, where there is change, there must be 

 a succession of states. There cannot be change and 

 motion is only a particular case of change unless there 

 is something different at one time from what there is 

 at some other time. Change, therefore, must involve 

 relations and complexity, and must demand analysis. So 

 long as our analysis has only gone as far as other smaller 

 changes, it is not complete ; if it is to be complete, it must 

 end with terms that are not changes, but are related by a 

 relation of earlier and later. In the case of changes which 

 appear continuous, such as motions, it seems to be impos- 

 sible to find anything other than change so long as we deal 

 with finite periods of time, however short. We are thus 

 driven back, by the logical necessities of the case, to the 

 conception of instants without duration, or at any rate 

 without anv duration which even the most delicate 

 instruments can reveal. This conception, though it can 

 be made to seem difficult, is really easier than any other 

 that the facts allow. It is a kind of logical framework 

 into which any tenable theory must fit not necessarily 

 itself the statement of the crude facts, but a form in 

 which statements which are true of the crude facts can 

 be made by a suitable interpretation. The direct con- 



