228 SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



has, at one time or another, stirred men's passions pro- 

 foundly, and the fear that the will might not be free has 

 been to some men a source of great unhappiness. I 

 believe that, under the influence of a cool analysis, the 

 doubtful questions involved will be found to have no such 

 emotional importance as is sometimes thought, since the 

 disagreeable consequences supposed to flow from a denial 

 of free will do not flow from this denial in any form in 

 which there is reason to make it. It is not, however, on 

 this account chiefly that I wish to discuss this problem, 

 but rather because it affords a good example of the 

 clarifying effect of analysis and of the interminable con- 

 troversies which may result from its neglect. 



Let us first try to discover what it is we really desire 

 when we desire free will. Some of our reasons for desir- 

 ing free will are profound, some trivial. To begin with 

 the former : we do not wish to feel ourselves in the 

 hands of fate, so that, however much we may desire to 

 will one thing, we may nevertheless be compelled by an 

 outside force to will another. We do not wish to think 

 that, however much we may desire to act well, heredity 

 and surroundings may force us into acting ill. We wish 

 to feel that, in cases of doubt, our choice is momentous 

 and lies within our power. Besides these desires, which 

 are worthy of all respect, we have, however, others not 

 so respectable, which equally make us desire free will. 

 We do not like to think that other people, if they knew 

 enough, could predict our actions, though we know that 

 we can often predict those of other people, especially if 

 they are elderly. Much as we esteem the old gentleman 

 who is our neighbour in the country, we know that when 

 grouse are mentioned he will tell the story of the grouse 

 in the gun-room. But we ourselves are not so mecha- 

 nical : we never tell an anecdote to the same person twice, 



