ON THE NOTION OF CAUSE 235 



are in this sense just as determined as the past. If we 

 saw future events in the same immediate way in which 

 we see past events, what kind of free will would still be 

 possible ? Such a kind would be wholly independent of 

 determinism : it could not be contrary to even the most 

 entirely universal reign of causality. And such a kind 

 must contain whatever is worth having in free will, since 

 it is impossible to believe that mere ignorance can be the 

 essential condition of any good thing. Let us therefore 

 imagine a set of beings who know the whole future 

 with absolute certainty, and let us ask ourselves whether 

 they could have anything that we should call free will. 



Such beings as we are imagining would not have to 

 wait for the event in order to know what decision they 

 were going to adopt on some future occasion. They 

 would know now what their volitions were going to 

 be. But would they have any reason to regret this 

 knowledge ? Surely not, unless the foreseen volitions 

 were in themselves regrettable. And it is less likely 

 that the foreseen volitions would be regrettable if the 

 steps which would lead to them were also foreseen. It 

 is difficult not to suppose that what is foreseen is fated, 

 and must happen however much it may be dreaded. 

 But human actions are the outcome of desire, and no 

 foreseeing can be true unless it takes account of desire. 

 A foreseen volition will have to be one which does not 

 become odious through being foreseen. The beings we 

 are imagining would easily come to know the causal 

 connections of volitions, and therefore their volitions 

 would be better calculated to satisfy their desires than 

 ours are. Since volitions are the outcome of desires, a 

 prevision of volitions contrary to desires could not be a 

 true one. It must be remembered that the supposed 

 prevision would not create the future any more than 



