2 4 o SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY 



In spite, however, of the new possibility of progress in 

 philosophy, the first effect, as in the case of physics, is 

 to diminish very greatly the extent of what is thought to 

 be known. Before Galileo, people believed themselves 

 possessed of immense knowledge on all the most interest- 

 ing questions in physics. He established certain facts as 

 to the way in which bodies fall, not very interesting on 

 their own account, but of quite immeasurable interest as 

 examples of real knowledge and of a new method whose 

 future fruitfulness he himself divined. But his few facts 

 sufficed to destroy the whole vast system of supposed 

 knowledge handed down from Aristotle, as even the 

 palest morning sun suffices to extinguish the stars. So 

 in philosophy : though some have believed one system, 

 and others another, almost all have been of opinion that 

 a great deal was known ; but all this supposed knowledge 

 in the traditional systems must be swept away, and a new 

 beginning must be made, which we shall esteem fortunate 

 indeed if it can attain results comparable to Galileo's law 

 of falling bodies. 



By the practice of methodological doubt, if it is 

 genuine and prolonged, a certain humility as to our 

 knowledge is induced : we become glad to know anything 

 in philosophy, however seemingly trivial. Philosophy 

 has suffered from the lack of this kind of modesty. It 

 has made the mistake of attacking the interesting problems 

 at once, instead of proceeding patiently and slowly, 

 accumulating whatever solid knowledge was obtainable, 

 and trusting the great problems to the future. Men of 

 science are not ashamed of what is intrinsically trivial, if 

 its consequences are likely to be important ; the immediate 

 outcome of an experiment is hardly ever interesting on 

 its own account. So in philosophy, it is often desirable 

 to expend time and care on matters which, judged alone, 



