160 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



by the abstract terms which he has formed to express it. The physio- 

 logical materialist can never meet the demand which a proof of his 

 belief requires, viz., that he should be able to consider the nervous 

 system apai't from consciousness before declaring it the sole cause of 

 consciousness. All that is known of the nervous system is known 

 through consciousness ; is there, then, no importance, no necessity, for 

 some examination of consciousness for those who would give an account 

 of their knowledge, be its content what it may ? This position, rightly 

 understood, will vindicate my assertion that, for all forms of investiga- 

 tion, the need at present is a critique of knowing, a critique which 

 shall be not simply a "Zuriickgehen auf Kant" (profitable as this 

 might prove for an understanding of his relation to materialism), but 

 a critique which shall embody the contributions of recent years from 

 investigators in the territories of the senses, the understanding, and 

 the emotions. 



It may be asked, Why should this appeal for consciousness come so 

 late in the present discussion ? Ought it not rather to have preceded 

 the statement of the characteristics of consciousness, and so prevented 

 a break in the course of thought ? Such a break is, of course, unde- 

 sirable ; still, it is one not to be avoided, as I think, under the circum- 

 stances. 



There remain for consideration certain special features of con- 

 sciousness, for whose examination and estimation special entreaty was 

 needed. This solicitation will have more force when placed in direct 

 connection with the features themselves. The writer ventured to 

 hope that those broader, more noticeable characteristics of conscious- 

 ness which lie, as it were, upon the surface, might be left to awaken 

 attention by their size. Not so with matters now to be brought for- 

 ward. While there is no purpose to leave, even for an instant, the 

 territory of experience, we enter a j)ortion of that territory which, to 

 many, will be new, and therefore, without effort against prejudice, un- 

 true. 



There are certain special facts in consciousness, i. e., ceilain dis- 

 tinctive features in each person's experience, which prevent, out and 

 out, the acceptance of correlation as a proper account of the relations 

 between brain and consciousness. Few would refuse to admit that 

 sensation is a fact, yet there is danger of studying sensation with the 

 sensation omitted. 



Every sensation has four physical antecedents which, though dis- 

 tinct, are not different in kind from one another. This is such a pre- 

 ponderance of the physical that the other element is likely to go un- 

 noticed. The physical requisites for every sensation are : 1. Some 

 outward, exciting cause or excitation this is physical movement, 

 nothing else ; it may be of ponderable matter or of an imponderable 

 instrument, as light. 2. The contact of this physical condition of 

 movement with a sensitive portion of the body. 3. The excitation- 



