ETHICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY. 371 



aside from these one can speak of Nature's purposes, of purposes which 

 general Nature is pursuing, only if he regards Nature as a thinking and 

 volitional being, or as the creature of such a being. A teleological 

 view of the world thus of necessity always includes some kind of a 

 theological view ; and it seems to be decidedly a non-sequitur to en- 

 tertain the one without holding to the other. 



We men actually make our continued existence an object of fun- 

 damental importance, because, without realizing it, no other object 

 is attainable. We are thus justified in calling all our properties that 

 contribute to the maintenance of life adapted to that purpose. And, 

 as we refer this same relation to the animal and the whole organic 

 world, we are accustomed also to designate all their life-maintaining 

 properties as likewise adapted. But life is never a purpose to animals. 

 The idea of preserving life does not arise in their consciousness, and 

 can not therefore be the object of a volition ; while the lower animals 

 have no ideas, but only sensations and perceptions. They have, there- 

 fore, no purposes. Still less can we speak of the purposes of plants, 

 for plants have no consciousness. It is thus clear that, so far as the 

 sub-human world is concerned, the designation of the life-preserving 

 attributes of existence as designed, unless we are speaking in a theo- 

 logical sense, is only metaphorical. For this designation implies the 

 premise that life is an object ; and this, in a proper, untheological 

 sense, is true only as respects human consciousness. Thus, a speaker 

 who would avoid transcendental implications and metaphorical modes 

 of speech should always avoid the word " designed," and this can be 

 done without leaving any fact undetermined. 



But, if we, regarding our belief in God as a justification for the 

 introduction of the divine idea into science, and not heeding the 

 many difficulties which ethics has hitherto encountered in basing its 

 precepts on the presumed will of God, endeavor to determine what 

 his will is, we shall have very little, if any, success in convincing 

 the faithful that it is for the most prolonged existence of the greatest 

 number. 



Even as relating to men, these persons will not believe that self- 

 preservation as such is the highest good. Bare existence is no good, 

 much less the highest good ; but it may be, if it is a bad existence, 

 the highest evil, and this according to the perfectionist doctrine as 

 well as according to the utilitarian theory of happiness. There is said 

 to be existence, yes, eternal existence, even in hell ; and, according to 

 the ancient fathers of the Church, " the most prolonged existence for 

 the greatest number." 



Evolutionists, who recognize that life is valuable only as it is good, 

 have occasionally fallen into the mistake of considering among the 

 consequences of conduct only the effects on the condition of soundness, 

 and of disregarding the pain that may be immediately produced by it ; 

 and they have not always been mindful that, according to their own 



