74 



HARD WICKE ' S S CIENCE- G SSI P. 



diately set off for the old building or place, with whose 

 proper name alone he is familiar." As the German 

 metaphysician has it, "a dog knows his master, but 

 does not recognise him through his peculiar marks or 

 attributes, and thereby does not properly discriminate 

 him from other persons." That brutes possess the 

 faculty of voluntary reminiscence is very doubtful. 

 Hence the power of reflection is denied to them, and 

 hence also any elevated form of conscious sagacity is 

 with them impossible. From birds upwards, there 

 appears a subtle power, which may be termed the 

 symbolic faculty. It constitutes a most important 

 and indispensable factor in the operations of the mind 

 of the lower animals. It implies a knowledge, not 

 merely of the concrete object itself as observed by the 

 senses, but also that this object is representative or 

 suggestive of something else. The master putting on 

 his hat and grasping his cane, &c, suggests to the 

 dog the idea of some particular delightful walk pre- 

 viously experienced, and he manifests by barking and 

 frisking, the anticipation of enjoying such pleasure 

 over again. This power operates through the asso- 

 ciation of ideas, and is strictly confined to the concrete, 

 and does not embrace the wondrous symbolic power 

 of human language and gesture, which is absolutely 

 unique. 



There is no doubt that brutes can compare one in- 

 dividual object or event with another, and thereby 

 ascertain some relation between them, as that of simi- 

 larity or difference, or quantity, &c. But this sort of 

 acquisition, although it enlarges knowledge, has been 

 regarded as a fact of observation merely, not of 

 reasoning, properly speaking. The latter does |not 

 strictly enlarge our knowledge, it merely developes 

 or unfolds or explicates it. Thus, for example, we 

 acquire the knowledge that the elk is ruminant by 

 reflecting upon the previously known proposition that 

 all horned animals are ruminant. The lower animals 

 cannot by an act of reasoning draw forth and prove 

 their knowledge, or make it available for use in 

 further inquiry. But they are sufficiently versed in 

 that sort of knowledge which is concrete and par- 

 ticular, and not summed up into general truths. Some 

 speculators maintain that " the animal intelligence can 

 elaborate that class of abstract ideas that may be 

 developed by simple feelings such as hunger." This 

 kind of abstract notion is, however, strictly personal, 

 so to speak ; it does not embrace objects external to 

 the animal itself. It is perhaps less frequently formed, 

 even by man, than most other abstractions, it is of 

 little service in advancing science or knowledge, and 

 it is so constantly referable to particular instances, 

 that it is almost hopeless to endeavour to demonstrate 

 the reality of an abstraction at all. It is unquestion- 

 able, however, that there exists among brutes a 

 faculty of special association, but it operates exclu- 

 sively amongst concrete or particular notions, and it 

 is probably due mainly to the special strength, com- 

 prehensiveness, and keenness of the faculties of obser- 



vation of these animals. Hence they can learn to 

 play dominoes, but not to play draughts, and many 

 of them can recognise the time upon a watch, &c, 

 yet cannot perform the simplest feat in mental arith- 

 metic. Any problem that requires for its solution 

 that several reminiscences must be conjured up at will 

 is utterly beyond the scope and resources of the 

 lower animal mind. 



Such, it may be assumed, is the actual constitution 

 of the higher forms of intellect among the lower 

 animals. Now, in what manner does this intellect- 

 power operate in the guidance of action ? This is a 

 question of exceeding interest, of extreme subtlety, 

 and of no small difficulty. Let us, however, 

 endeavour to carry the torch of explanation into the 

 thick shades of doubt wherewith the theme is en- 

 compassed. The actual cause of any bodily action 

 not merely spontaneous is, as we all know, some 

 form of feeling or emotion ; but in the actual per- 

 formance or carrying out of this action, a faculty that 

 has been termed "reason" officiates as a guide or 

 pilot. The steam-power impels the ship, but the 

 man at the helm directs its course. Now, rejecting 

 for the time all consideration of instinct, which is 

 invariably unconscious and mechanical, it may be 

 admitted that animals possess " a power of gathering 

 up the past experience into rules of conduct that 

 guide them in their solitary or gregarious life." This 

 power clearly results from the association of concrete 

 ideas according to the law of contiguity. It is 

 possible, however, that much of this experience is 

 organic, i.e., the organism has the power of register- 

 ing the results of previous impressions. Thus, in the 

 working out of a design, birds ' ' often learn to use 

 special means when special ends have to be provided 

 for." In these instances, it may occur that the innate 

 power of the instinctive faculty may be able to 

 spontaneously expand itself so as to meet existing 

 circumstances ; and it may be fairly doubted if such 

 intelligential modifications of the instinctive tendency 

 are due to conscious reason on the part of the animal. 

 The unconscious instinct of nest-building exhibited 

 by birds must necessarily be adapted, or must spon- 

 taneously adapt itself, to existing circumstances. 

 The same unconscious faculty that induces a sand- 

 marten to tunnel into a sand-bank, can also induce a 

 jackdaw to build an extra support to a nest that had 

 several times slid down a sloping window sill. It is 

 barely necessary to observe, that the principal and 

 more obvious actions of an animal, such as eating, 

 sleeping, frisking, or wandering listlessly about, 

 require for their guidance little or no power of 

 intellect, as such. This latter faculty is more clearly 

 exhibited in its function of pilot in these special 

 actions, such as those of the dog, which so frequently 

 challenge our admiration, and which are so com- 

 monly and ignorantly ascribed to instinct. These 

 specially wondrous and remarkable actions are 

 guided either by special association of concrete 



