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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



tionary treatment for the partially supernat- 

 ural explanations implied in Social Statics, 

 has made a freer use of the inductive method 

 in support of his deduced principles of ethi- 

 cal and social growth, and has given the law 

 of relativity greater prominence as influenc- 

 ing his practical conclusions, some of which, 

 as expressed tentatively in Social Statics, 

 have been modified or rejected in the pres- 

 ent volume. 



Defining the objective law of subhuman 

 justice as that social condition wherein 

 " each individual shall receive the benefits 

 and evils of its own nature and its conse- 

 quent conduct," Mr. Spencer also points out 

 that among gregarious creatures this objec- 

 tive law is modified by the necessity for self- 

 subordination and occasional self-sacrifice in 

 the interest of the species. Human justice 

 is simply a natural development of subhu- 

 man justice. The growing necessity for co- 

 operation imposes an increasing obligation 

 for individual restraint ; and the social sen- 

 timents, of which the sentiment of justice 

 is chief in importance, are correspondingly 

 evolved. 



An important difference is pointed out be- 

 tween family ethics and the ethics of the state. 

 In the former the obligations of parents are 

 conditioned upon the children's needs, while 

 in the latter obligations are proportioned to 

 the nature and actions rather than the needs 

 of the individual. A clear distinction is drawn 

 between the sentiment of justice and the idea 

 of justice. The former may be strong, while 

 the latter is relatively weak. Men may un- 

 derstand clearly that they ought to deal justly 

 by their neighbors, but have a very imper- 

 fect comprehension of the course of action 

 which justice requires. The primary char- 

 acteristic of the idea of justice, contrary to 

 the popular understanding, is that of in- 

 equality. The natures and consequent ac- 

 tivities of individuals are greatly unequal. 

 Justice, therefore, requires that they shall 

 receive correspondingly unequal rewards. 

 The spheres or opportunities of all, however, 

 should be mutually bounded, and hence ap- 

 proximately equal. The formula of justice 

 may accordingly be expressed by saying, 

 "Every man is free to do that which he 

 wills, provided he infringes not the equal 

 freedom of any other man." 



Mr. Spencer incidentally defends with 



great ability the approximate validity of 

 fixed intuitions or deductions against the 

 positivistic disciples of an exclusively in- 

 ductive method of reasoning. Such intui- 

 tions, he shows, " must have been established 

 by that intercourse with things, which, 

 through an enormous past, has, directly or 

 indirectly, determined the organization of 

 the nervous system and certain resulting 

 necessities of thought." Ethical intuitions, 

 however, require the correction of methodic 

 criticism and the application of inductive 

 tests. Both methods work together for the 

 discovery of truth. 



In the subsequent chapters the rights 

 and duties of individuals and governments 

 are deduced from the foregoing principles. 

 Man's fundamental right is declared to be 

 that of physical integrity. Under the law 

 of relative ethics this right can only be per- 

 fectly maintained in a state of permanent 

 peace. The rights of man to free motion 

 and locomotion are next asserted rights 

 which conflict, of course, with all forms of 

 serfdom or slavery. The recognition of these 

 rights is said to have been of very recent 

 origin. In early times "the conception of 

 freedom as an inalienable right had little 

 or no place either in ethics or law. . . . 

 Neither Christ nor his apostles denounced 

 slavery." It may, however, be maintained 

 by Christian apologists that certain seed- 

 principles contained in the Gospels are in 

 logical conflict with slavery, and exerted a 

 powerful though indirect influence toward 

 its overthrow. 



In the important chapter on The Eight 

 to the Uses of Natural Media, after noticing 

 some of the habitual infringements on 

 the admitted right of all to free light and 

 air as by smokers in public places, injuri- 

 ous fumes from chemical works, bad street 

 music, etc. Mr. Spencer attacks the much- 

 agitated land question. He reaffirms the 

 principle laid down in Social Statics, that 

 all men have a natural right to the use of 

 the soil a right which, he strongly asserts, 

 has everywhere been alienated by force and 

 fraud. Its fundamental character is now 

 tacitly admitted, however, he claims, in the 

 universally recognized principle of eminent 

 domain, in defense of which he quotes Sir 

 Frederick Pollock, nis final conclusions on 

 this subject, however, will not be acceptable 



