432 F. A. BATHER [december 



" chain of physical causation which joins the works of man and of other 

 living beings to that part of the order of nature to which they are 

 adjusted." The remaining question is whether life itself and all its 

 faculties are purely physical phenomena, or contain something which 

 cannot " be expressed in terms of physical matter and mechanical 

 energy." If purely physical, then usefulness and contrivance are a 

 part of, and not interference with, the order of physical nature ; and 

 living beings can " afford no peculiar evidence of purpose." But the 

 question is not yet answered, and the argument from contrivance, 

 though its probability is vastly lessened, has not yet received its death- 

 blow. 



But, supposing the mechanical conception of life to be established, 

 and admitting that the argument from contrivance would thereby lose 

 its force, the attempted proof of the existence of a designer would not 

 on that account be supplanted by disproof. Further, whatever the 

 scientific account of nature may ultimately be, it can throw no light 

 upon the primal cause or final purpose of the whole or of any part. 

 Science tells us what takes place, and how it takes place, she dis- 

 covers the succession of events and gives us a reasonable confidence in 

 the steadfastness of that succession, but she refuses to admit any 

 necessity therefor, and as to any cause that lies behind the veil of 

 the physical universe, she remains for ever dumb. 



But, though the scientific method may throw no light on anything 

 beyond the facts of nature, it is still open to inquiry whether the con- 

 sideration of nature as a whole may not throw some light upon the 

 ultimate cause. Thus we are led to the conception finely expressed by 

 Oerstedt in the phrase : " The works of nature are the thoughts of 

 God." This view has been elaborated by a great philosopher, Bishop 

 Berkeley, and by a great naturalist, Louis Agassiz. Each in his way 

 maintains that the phenomena of nature constitute " a language in 

 which the Creator tells us the story of creation for our delight and in- 

 struction and advantage." But each weakened his case and lost the 

 adhesion of modern naturalists, because, as Dr. Brooks insists, he 

 attempted to prove too much. Agassiz thought it necessary to show 

 that the laws of nature were nothing but categories of thought, that 

 they were arbitrary, and that no physical explanation of them was 

 possible. Berkeley wrote : " The great Mover and Author of nature 

 constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of men by the sensible inter- 

 vention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or necessary 

 connection with the things signified." And in another place he held 

 that this language of nature was necessary to assist the governed. But 

 the modern naturalist is aware of many a physical explanation unknown 

 to Agassiz ; he sees more connection between the sign and the thing 

 signified than was possible for Berkeley ; and he refuses to admit any 

 necessity in the matter. 



But a conception supported by indefensible arguments is not 



