34 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



sense that physicists speak of momentum passing into heat ; that 

 whether consciousness arise or not, there will he for the molecular 

 motion set up in the nerve-substance exactly the same mechanical 

 equivalents. Whether, for example, those ganglia that in the hody 

 of each one of us are employed in carrying on what we call reflex ac- 

 tion, are so many distinct seats of consciousness, like so many separate 

 animals, an idea for which much has been said, or whether the nerve- 

 changes that go on in these ganglia have no subjective side ; in either 

 case the objective facts will remain the same. If consciousness is 

 evolved, it is not at the expense of a single oscillation of a molecule 

 disappearing from the object-world. No doubt it is hard to conceive 

 consciousness arising in this apparently self-created way; but, if any 

 suppose that by using phrases that would assimilate mind to motion 

 they ease the difficulty, they but delude themselves. It is as easy to 

 think of consciousness arising out of nothing, if they will, as to con- 

 ceive it as manufactured out of motion ; that is to say, the one and the 

 other proposition are alike absolutely unthinkable. On this point Mr. 

 Spencer writes: " Can we think of the subjective and objective activi- 

 ties as the same ? Can the oscillations of a molecule be presented in 

 consciousness side by side with a nervous shock, and the two be rec- 

 ognized as one ? No effort enables us to assimilate them. That a 

 unit of feeling: has nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes 

 more than ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition." 

 Mr. Spencer's idea is that feeling and nervous action are two faces of 

 the same ontological something a view that prohibits the notion of 

 the one passing into or being expended in producing the other. The 

 conclusion is, that the transformations of physical energy remain un- 

 affected by the presence or absence of consciousness. 



Psychology has as yet been made a serious study by only a few in- 

 dividuals. Accordingly, it is only the more striking and easily grasped 

 peculiarities of Mr. Spencer's system that can be referred to with ad- 

 vantage. Of these, the most imposing, and the one of which the edu- 

 cated public have already a slight second-hand acquaintance, is the 

 doctrine that the brain and nervous system is an organized register of 

 the experiences of past generations, that consequently the intelligence 

 and character of individuals and of races depend much more on this, 

 on the experiences of their ancestors, than on their individual expe- 

 riences. The flood of light thrown by this conception on so many 

 things previously dark and unfathomable, its power of bringing about 

 harmony where before there was nothing but confusion and unsatis- 

 factory wrangling, ought to have been sufficient to have secured it a 

 universally favorable reception. This, however, has not been the case, 

 and partly, perhaps, because of the very merits that recommend it. 

 It may be that veterans who have won their laurels on, say, the battle- 

 field of innate ideas, love the old controversy, and are not anxious 

 to learn that both sides were right and both wrong. Moreover, it is 



